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ABSTRACT
Dynamic Shifting of Virtual Network Topologies for Network Attack Prevention
Lenoy Avidan
Computer networks were not designed with security in mind, making
research into the subject of network security vital. Virtual Networks are similar to
computer networks, except the components of a Virtual Network are in software
rather than hardware. With the constant threat of attacks on networks, security is
always a big concern, and Virtual Networks are no different. Virtual Networks have
many potential attack vectors similar to physical networks, making research into
Virtual Network security of great importance. Virtual Networks, since they are
composed of virtualized network components, have the ability to dynamically
change topologies. In this paper, we explore Virtual Networks and their ability to
quickly shift their network topology. We investigate the potential use of this
flexibility to protect network resources and defend against malicious activities.
To show the ability of reactively shifting a Virtual Network’s topology to
secure a network, we create a set of four experiments, each with a different dynamic
topology shift, or “dynamic defense”. These four groups of experiments are called
the Server Protection, Isolated Subnet, Distributed Port Group, and Standard Port
Group experiments. The Server Protection experiments involve detecting an attack
against a server and shifting the server behind a protected subnet. The other three
sets of experiments, called Attacker Prevention experiments, involve detecting a
malicious node in the internal network and initiating a dynamic defense to move the
attacker behind a protected subnet. Each Attacker Prevention experiment utilizes a
different dynamic defense to prevent the malicious node from attacking the rest of
the Virtual Network. For each experiment, we run 6 different network attacks to
validate the effectiveness of the dynamic defenses. The network attacks utilized for
each experiment are ICMP Flooding, TCP Syn Flooding, Smurf attack, ARP
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Spoofing, DNS Spoofing, and NMAP Scanning. Our validation shows that our
dynamic defenses, outside of the standard port group, are very effective in stopping
each attack, consistently lowering the attacks’ success rate significantly. The
Standard Port Group was the one dynamic defense that is ineffective, though there
are also a couple of experiments that could benefit from being run with more
attackers and with different situations to fully understand the effectiveness of the
defenses. We believe that, as Virtual Networks become more common and utilized
outside of data centers, the ability to dynamically shift topology can be used for
network security purposes.
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to:
• Tissa, for guiding me through this project and for giving me all the help and
resources I needed to complete my thesis. I could not have accomplished this
without your guidance.
• Dr. DeBruhl, for advising me on my project and pushing me in the right
direction when I came to you for help. You were always helpful and enthusiastic
in your assistance.
• Dr. Bellardo, for all you taught me on the thesis process and all your help with
all aspects of my masters degree.
• Dr. Keen for being on my committee and for finding interest in my thesis.
• My loving family, Aba, Ema, Shawn, Ashley, and Milli, for being so supportive
and giving me encouragement to complete my work.
• Jess, for always being there for me and getting me through the ups and downs
of my thesis.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Network Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Denial of Service (DOS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) 6
2.1.1.1 Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1.2 Detection and Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1.3 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Man in the Middle (MITM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2.1 Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.2.2 Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.2.3 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Virtual Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 Network Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.3 Nested Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.4 Virtual Network Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.4.1 Virtualization Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.4.2 Network Virtualization Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Virtual Network Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Enterprise Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.1.1 VMware Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
vii
2.3.1.2 Juniper Contrail Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.1.3 OpenStack Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.1.4 Apache CloudStack Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.1.5 Oracle VirtualBox “Architecture” . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.2 Architecture Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1 Virtual Network Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Security Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Attack Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.1 TCP Syn Flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.2 ICMP Flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.3 Smurf Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.4 ARP Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.5 DNS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.6 NMAP Scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 Dynamic Defense Design in Virtual Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1 Dynamic Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1.1 Server Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1.2 Attacker Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.2.1 Isolated Subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.2.2 Distributed Port Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.1.2.3 Standard Port Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.1 DOS/DDOS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2.2 MITM/Scan Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
viii
4.2.2.1 ARP Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2.2.2 DNS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2.2.3 NMAP Scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.1 Server Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2 Attacker Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2.1 Isolated Subnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2.2 Distributed Port Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2.3 Standard Port Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Architecture Comparison Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1 Example of a Simple Distributed Denial of Service System . . . . . 6
2 After Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Hosted Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 Hypervisor Virtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Simple Virtual Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6 Hardware-Assisted Nested Virtualization Diagram from Nestcloud . 28
7 VMware vSphere Standard Switch Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8 VMware vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture . . . . . . . . . . 41
9 VMware vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture Data Flow Example 43
10 VMware vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture Packet Flow Ex-
ample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11 Juniper Contrail Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
12 OpenStack Virtual Network Basic Layout for a Classic Open vSwitch
Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
13 OpenStack Virtual Network’s Network Node Design . . . . . . . . . 53
14 OpenStack Virtual Network’s Compute Node Design . . . . . . . . 54
15 OpenStack’s Virtual Network Architecture and Components . . . . 55
16 OpenStack’s High Availability using Distributed Virtual Router Ar-
chitecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
17 Apache CloudStack’s Virtual Network Architecture and Components 58
18 Apache CloudStack’s Virtual Network Small-Scale Deployment . . . 59
19 Topology of Host Virtual Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
20 VCenter GUI and Clusters Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
21 Distributed vSwitch Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
xi
22 The Distributed Firewall GUI and Example Rules . . . . . . . . . . 71
23 The Spoof Guard GUI and Example Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
24 Snort Rules for Attack Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
25 Snort Rules for ARP Spoofing Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
26 Virtual Network Overview with Nested Hosts and VMs . . . . . . . 78
27 Topology for Server Protection Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
28 Firewall Rules for Protection from ICMP Dos, TCP Dos, Smurf and
NMAP Scan Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
29 Firewall Rule for ARP Spoofing Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
30 Spoof Guard Protection for DNS Spoof and ARP Spoof Attacks . . 83
31 Topologies for Isolated Subnet Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
32 Topologies for Distributed Port Group Experiments . . . . . . . . . 90
33 Firewall Rules for Prevention of ICMP Dos, TCP Dos, and NMAP
Scan Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
34 Topologies for Standard Port Group Experiments . . . . . . . . . . 94
35 Client’s Bash Scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
36 Example of ARP Table Output for Victim Server . . . . . . . . . . 99
37 Example Nslookup Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
38 Example NMAP Output from Attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
39 Results for Server Protection DOS Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . 103
40 Percent Change for Server Protection DOS Experiments . . . . . . 105
41 Results for Server Protection MITM/Scan Experiments . . . . . . . 105
42 Results for Isolated Subnet DOS Experiments for Topology 1 . . . 108
43 Results for Isolated Subnet DOS Experiments for Topology 2 . . . 110
44 Percent Change for Isolated Subnet DOS Experiments . . . . . . . 111
45 Results for Isolated Subnet MITM/Scan Experiments . . . . . . . . 112
xii
46 Results for Distributed Port Group DOS Experiments for Topology 1 113
47 Results for Distributed Port Group DOS Experiments for Topology 2 115
48 Percent Change for Average Download Time for Distributed Port
Group DOS Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
49 Results for Distributed Port Group MITM/Scan Experiments . . . 117
50 Results for the Standard Port Group Experiments . . . . . . . . . . 120
xiii
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Networks are an integral part of our society today. We rely on them to
exchange data around the world in the blink of an eye. However, networks were not
originally designed with much security in mind. Many network protocols relied on
people having good intentions and following the rules. We now know that this is not
realistic, as there are many malicious users throughout the world’s largest network,
the Internet. Security is a huge challenge in networks because there are many
protocols that were designed with no security. With the vast resources many
malicious hackers have and the many possible points of entry, it is nearly impossible
to stop all possible attacks. Even with the difficulty of preventing every threat,
proper security for a network can make it very hard on an attacker. While
traditional networks were thought out and built many years ago, Virtual Networks
are a newer concept. Virtual Networks are similar to Virtual Machines (VMs), in
that they are built purely in software, but still rely on hardware. Virtual Networks
perform the functionality of hardware routers and switches inside VMs, allowing for
multiple virtual routers or switches on the same physical host [45]. Because there
can be multiple virtual routers/switches on a physical machine, Virtual Networks
can physically overlap while being logically separate. Virtual Networks also allow
for a logical overlapping of physically separate networks. Virtual Networks also have
the ability to change network topology on the fly, allowing for greater flexibility
than physical networks.
In some ways Virtual Networks improve security and in other ways they open
up the possibility of new threats. Being in a sandboxed VM is one advantage that
potentially comes with a virtualized network [5]. This lowers the possibility of a
virus breaking out of a VM and spreading to other network nodes, since the VM’s
memory is isolated from the rest of the machine, as we explain in the background
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section. At the same time, the communication between the Virtual Network
manager and the nodes opens up a new attack space. However, despite the new
security advantages and disadvantages that come with Virtual Networks, the
majority of their vulnerabilities are similar to those of physical networks [62]. There
are countless numbers of possible network attacks, and that is no different for
Virtual Networks. So while Virtual Networks do open up new opportunities for
attacks, the majority of vulnerabilities for traditional networks still apply [5].
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the ability for Virtual Networks to
change their topology is currently not used with security in mind. It is more utilized
for its flexibility in changing to a topology that fits the networks needs at a given
moment and for a break in case of emergency when a node or link fails. However,
with proper identification of which topologies are more vulnerable and which are
more secure against certain network attacks, a Virtual Network’s topology could be
changed to defend against these attacks. One could argue that this is unnecessary,
as patches could be used to protect against attacks. However, an attack might
exploit a vulnerability without a patch or is not leveraging any vulnerabilities, such
as denial of service. Changing topology could prevent or slow down the target while
certain components are being patched.
A system which would allow for the transformation of a network from one
topology to another could greatly improve the security of that network. Virtual
networks allow for this transformation, unlocking the ability to always be in the
best topology to defend against an impending attack or an attack that is already
underway. Traditional networks make it very hard to reconfigure the network
topology, since it would entail physically changing and moving connections. The
routers and switches would also have to relearn the topology through their MAC
and IP tables.
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There have been numerous studies, experiments, and evaluations on the
different security aspects of traditional networks and even Software-Defined
Networks. However, there has not been as much research into the security aspects of
Virtual Networks. Virtual networks allow for many things that traditional networks
don’t, such as creating multiple overlapping (but logically separate) networks and
dynamic topology changes. My contribution to the field of Virtual Networks will be
a set of experiments that measures the impact of using dynamic security defenses in
Virtual Networks to defend against network attacks. To do this, we design a set of
dynamic defenses and network attacks. Dynamic defenses involve shifting the
topology of the network by moving a VM to a different subnet or physical machine.
There are four types of dynamic defenses: Server Protection, Isolated Subnet,
Distributed Port Group, and Standard Port Group. These defenses use virtual
network security functions such as a distributed firewall, spoof guard, or an
isolated/protected subnet (black hole). To test the effectiveness of these topology
shifts, we use 6 network attacks: TCP Syn DOS, ICMP DOS, Smurf attack, ARP
Poisoning/Spoofing, DNS Poisoning/Spoofing, and NMAP Scanning. We test the
success of the attacks before and after the dynamic defenses have been initiated to
determine the effectiveness of each. Our experiments show that the success rate of
each attack drops dramatically once the dynamic defenses take place and either the
victim is more heavily protected or the attacker is more isolated. With that
knowledge, ideally future security mechanisms for Virtual Networks can utilize
dynamic topology shifts in response to and to prevent network attacks. While the
defenses may not seem necessary, they could allow protection while waiting for an
admin to take action
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives background
on network attacks, Virtual Networks, and Virtual Network Architectures. Chapter
3 discuss our system design, describing how our Virtual Network environment is
3
created and set up. Chapter 4 discuss our experimental design, giving details on
how we test the validity of our system. Chapter 5 looks at the results of the
experiments and analyzes them. Chapter 6 is related works. Chapter 7 concludes
the paper with a brief recap of our system and results.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
To fully understand the set of experiments run, some background into
network security and network virtualization is needed. In this chapter, we go over
the concepts used throughout this paper and explain how they work. In our
experiments, we run network attacks to test our dynamic defenses. To understand
these attacks, we give background in section 2.1 on network attacks, specifically
denial of service and man in the middle attacks. We also utilize virtualization of
network and security components, and nested virtualization, which we explain in
section 2.2. Finally, in section 2.3, we describe the different Virtual Network
Architectures that exist and how they work. This helps explain the system we use
for our experimentation and why we selected it. We begin with a background of
network attacks.
2.1 Network Attacks
There are many different ways to attack a network. Many of the existing
network protocols were designed without much security in mind, making for many
network vulnerabilities. The vast scale of devices communicating with each other
and the vast number of subnets make it impossible to secure every area of a network.
Limited resources generally force admins, especially in large companies, to choose
how to most effectively disperse their resources. Even with the right tools to secure
a network, it is up to the network admins to use them properly. Any improper use,
whether it be accidental or due to lack of knowledge, opens the door for attackers to
take advantage of some vulnerability. Even with everything in the network set up
perfectly, there is the possibility of some existing vulnerability in a device or even of
a zero-day attack. On top of that, network admins must balance security with
usability and ease of use. It would be most secure for a network to allow no
5
Figure 1: Example of a Simple Distributed Denial of Service System
communication outside of its internal network, but this is infeasible as devices need
to communicate with the outside world. In this section, we provide background on
different network attacks related to the ones used in our experiments. We divide
this section into two parts: Denial of Service/Distributed Denial of Service and Man
in the Middle attacks. For each category, we provide some background on the
different attacks, discuss how to detect them and what countermeasures exist, and
list the tools that can be used to carry them out. We start by looking at Denial of
Service and Distributed Denial of Service attacks, or DOS/DDOS attacks.
2.1.1 Denial of Service (DOS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)
Denial of Service is an attempt to make network resources, services, or hosts
unavailable to its intended users, such as temporarily or indefinitely suspending
services to users [23]. DOS attacks generally target servers or machines servicing
multiple users, but could be used to target and prevent an individual user from
accessing some resource. DOS attacks are one of the most common types of attacks
due to the large number of different ways to carry them out [23]. They also are
generally very effective, especially against systems that aren’t properly secured.
A variation of Denial of Service is Distributed Denial of Service. DDOS is
similar to DOS, but utilizes multiple hosts. Both DOS and DDOS have the same
6
end goal, but DDOS uses multiple hosts to accomplish denial of service rather than
launching the attack from one host [10]. Figure 1 shows an example of a DDOS
attack. DDOS attacks involve a master and multiple zombies. The master is the
controller that communicates with the zombies and gives them commands, such as
when and who to attack [12]. Zombies are infected hosts who communicate with the
master and carry out attacks [12]. These zombies are infected with malware that
searches for other vulnerable hosts to infect and waits to be given commands by its
master. DDOS attacks have the potential for much greater disruption due to its
distributed nature [10]. Having many more hosts carrying out attacks means more
power and more ability to use up a resource to the point of denial of service. It also
makes it much harder to find the original source of the attacks because the workload
is divided between potentially many hosts, and the source of the attacks is
abstracted by its zombies [10]. Detection of these attacks is becoming harder as
these DDOS systems are increasingly reliant on shorter bursts, with more packets
per second spread across different sources [10].
In this section we look at the types and subtypes of DOS and DDOS attacks,
how to detect them, possible countermeasures, and what tools can be used. We
start by describing the different DOS/DDOS attack types.
2.1.1.1 Types
There are many different types of DOS and DDOS attacks, and even the
different subtypes of DOS attacks can be divided up into more attack subtypes.
Because of this we won’t list every single existing attack or go into too much detail
on each attack, but rather give a general overview of each attack and its subtypes.
1. Flooding:
Flooding is one of the most common ways to perform a DOS/DDOS attack. A
flooding attack is when an attacker sends the target so much data that it either
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slows down or stops the target’s services completely [43]. This can come either
through saturating the target’s links, using up some resource on the host, such as
memory, or through overtaxing the target by giving it more data than it can
process [43]. There are many types of flooding attacks, all taking advantage of
different, common network protocols.
(a) UDP Flooding:
This is a simple flooding attack that involves sending many, very large UDP
packets, either to use up some processing resource or to use up the victim
links’ bandwidth [43]. As with most flooding attacks, the source can be
abstracted by spoofing the source IP address or by distributing the work
among infected hosts [43]. This is one of the less resource intensive flooding
attacks to run for an attacker.
(b) Ping/ICMP Flooding:
Ping flooding is similar to UDP flooding, except with ping (ICMP)
packets [43]. Like UDP flooding, the goal is to use up the bandwidth of the
victim’s links.
(c) TCP Syn:
Rather than use up links’ bandwidth, this attack uses up a victim’s TCP
resources [43]. The attacker floods the victim server with TCP Syn requests
to create new connections. This could lead to outcomes such as preventing
new TCP connections or dropping current, valid TCP connections [43].
Either outcome would result in partial or full Denial of Service for many
users to whatever service the victim is providing.
(d) Reflection Attack:
A Reflection attack, or Reflective flooding, is a way to perform a DDOS
attack without having to infect other hosts. Reflective attacks involve
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sending network protocol packets that require a response from other hosts.
The attacker spoofs the source address of these packets as the victim’s IP
address and then sends many packets to many different hosts [43]. These
hosts then receive the packets and all send reply packets to the victim, since
its IP address is given as the source. This leads to a flood of packets
directed at the victim host, potentially causing a Denial of Service [43]. The
source of this type of attack is better abstracted than other types of flooding
attacks due to its distributed nature and the spoofed source IP address.
There are many different types of Reflective Flooding attacks. The most
common protocols used in Reflection attacks are NTP, DNS, CharGen,
SSDP and RIPv1 [19]. However, one of the most famous examples of a
Reflection Attack is the Smurf attack.
i. Smurf Attack:
A Smurf Attack is when an attacker performs a Reflective attack with
ICMP echo requests [43]. It was given the name Smurf in reference to
the cartoon ‘The Smurfs’ [43]. Smurfs are small, blue people who
individually are small and weak, but collectively could overwhelm a
stronger opponent. The attacker sends many ICMP echo packets with
the source IP address spoofed as the victim’s IP address, causing the
victim to receive large amounts of ICMP responses [43]. This
potentially saturates the victim’s links and causes a Denial of Service.
2. Application/Layer 7 Attack:
This form of DOS involves any use of application layer protocols such as DNS or
HTTP to cause a Denial of Service [23]. This attack may use flooding techniques
or could exhaust a host’s resources such as sockets, memory, etc. [23].
Application attacks are more dangerous than certain flooding attacks as they are
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more difficult to detect. This is because requests coming from an attacker are
almost indistinguishable from requests coming from authenticated users [23]. The
attack is more likely to pass through firewalls undetected, because defense
mechanisms based on TCP/IP authentication won’t catch application level
attacks, since they use valid TCP/IP headers [23].
(a) DNS Amplification Attack:
A DNS Amplification Attack is an attack that uses DNS queries to perform
a Reflective Flooding attack, similar to the Smurf Attack [51]. The attacker
sends many DNS queries with the source IP address spoofed with the
victim’s IP address. This causes DNS servers to send many DNS responses
to the victim host, potentially causing a Denial of Service [51].
3. Denial of Sleep Attack:
A Denial of Sleep attack involves draining a host’s energy to cause a Denial of
Service [31]. When the victim host’s receiver is in inactive mode (conserving
energy) the attacker starts bombarding the host with packets to drain its
energy [31]. The attacker only sends packets when the victim’s receiver is in
inactive mode. This attack requires detailed knowledge of the victim host’s MAC
layer protocol [31].
2.1.1.2 Detection and Countermeasures
There are many different ways to detect and react to DOS/DDOS attacks.
Here we list the different detection methods and countermeasures. We give basic
explanations of how each method works without explaining the math behind it, as
this would become too complex. We start with the detection methods.
1. Detection Methods
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(a) Anomaly-Based Detection:
Anomaly-Based detection involves monitoring the behavior of live
traffic [23]. Traffic data is compared to a baseline of how normal,
non-malicious traffic is expected to behave. To do this, a model is built with
training and testing data of what is considered normal and what is
considered malicious. A large majority of current DOS detection is done this
way and many IDS systems use this type of detection [23]. Some examples
include Fast Entropy Detection, Fuzzy Estimator and Multivariate
Correlation Analysis (MCA). This technique is beneficial because after it is
trained it doesn’t require large amounts of memory. However, it does have
the potential for inaccuracies, especially if the process of training the model
is done incorrectly. It also requires a large amount of time to train the
model initially [23].
(b) Data Mining Detection
Data Mining Detection is a signature-based form of DOS Detection [23]. A
number of attack signatures are stored in a database and traffic signatures
are compared to those in the database [23]. This requires no time spent on
training a model and thus can be used for immediate detection. However,
depending on the number of signatures in the database, it could use a large
amount of memory. It also could take a large amount of time to match the
signature in the database, depending on the number of signatures stored
and the method for searching [23].
2. Countermeasures
(a) Access Control Lists (ACLs):
An Access Control List is a list of rules that say what network behavior is
allowed and not allowed [43]. ACLs can accept, drop, or deny traffic based
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on a pre-determined list of patterns [43]. For example, one pattern could say
that any host from the subnet 192.168.144.0/24 cannot send HTTP traffic.
ACLs allows for potentially malicious data to be dropped, preventing an
attack from occuring. An example of an ACL is the command line tool
“iptables”.
(b) Rate Limiting:
Rate Limiting is a countermeasure that uses a threshold to determine when
to start dropping packets [43]. If some pre-determined data rate threshold is
reached by a host, group of hosts, or subnet, their packets are dropped.
Rate limiting, in combination with ACLs, are used by firewalls to prevent a
wide range of attacks, not just DOS/DDOS attacks [43].
(c) Amplification Honeypot:
An Amplification Honeypot is a honeypot specifically designed to prevent
reflection and amplification DOS attacks [19]. To prevent these attacks, the
honeypot emulates protocols that are generally abused by those DOS
attacks, making it an appealing target to attackers [19]. Attackers are then
likely to target the honeypot because they detect it as vulnerable, exposing
themselves as malicious and wasting their resources on a trap.
2.1.1.3 Tools
There are a few tools that can be used to carry out DOS attacks. DOS tools
generally aren’t overly complex, as many of the types of Denial of Service attacks
perform similar actions and don’t require large amounts of code. We list here a few
of these tools and give a brief summary of each.
1. Hping3:
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Hping3 is a tool in the Kali Linux OS [43]. It allows for the user to send different
types of flooding attacks such as TCP Syn flooding, UDP flooding, etc. It also
allows for further modification through setting sending intervals, spoofing of
source IP address, and many other options [43]. Hping3 is simple and quick, but
lacks the power needed for Distributed DOS attacks.
2. Hyenae packet generator:
Hyenae is a tool that allows for various DOS and Man in the Middle attacks [43].
Hyenae is more sophisticated than Hping3, allowing for more complex forging of
packets, running attacks through multiple zombie hosts (DDOS), and triggering
remote attacks from one master host [43].
3. Netflow/IPtraf:
Netflow and IPtraf are Cisco tools used to detect traffic flows [43]. They can be
used for the detection of DOS based attacks or for gathering information to be
used in launching DOS attacks.
4. Netstat:
Netstat is a tool that is used to list all the network connections of a machine [43].
It can be used to see the ingoing and outgoing connection, their types, and more
detailed information [43]. Netstat can be used to gather information to
determine whether a DOS/DDOS attack is being launched or to gather
information to be used in launching a DOS attack.
2.1.2 Man in the Middle (MITM)
A Man in the Middle (MITM) attack is an attack where a “malicious third
party secretly takes control of the communication channel between two or more
endpoints” [11]. The goal for the attack is to be able to either eavesdrop or
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manipulate information being shared between two parties. This could have many
end goals, such as stealing login info or even denial of service. There is also the
possibility of intercepting encryption keys if they are sent insecurely [11]. The keys
could then be used to make a connection seem secure for both parties, even though
the attacker would have access to all the data being exchanged. Once an attacker
has access to a channel of communication, they can perform many different attacks,
such as intercepting, dropping, modifying, or replacing packets being sent between
two parties [11]. In this section, we describe the different types of MITM attacks,
discuss possible countermeasures, and list the tools that can be used for it. We start
with describing different types of MITM attacks.
2.1.2.1 Types
There are many different Man in the Middle attack types and subtypes. We
don’t have space to list them all here, so we don’t describe every type. For each, we
give a brief description of the attack and list the attack subtypes. We start with
spoofing and poisoning attacks.
1. Spoofing and Poisoning:
A Spoofing Man in the Middle attack is when an attacker intercepts
communication through the use of spoofing [11]. This spoofing allows the
attacker to control any data transferred through the intercepted communication,
without the other parties having any knowledge. Spoofing can come in a few
different forms, such as an attacker pretending to be a device between the
victims or pretending to be the another party and spoofing the victim
directly [11]. There are many different forms of spoofing, each accomplishing a
similar goal in different ways.
(a) ARP Spoofing/Poisoning:
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ARP Spoofing is when an attacker modifies a victim’s local ARP cache [11].
The attacker associates their MAC address with some other device’s IP
address, causing messages sent from the victim to the spoofed device to be
sent to the attacker instead [11]. Generally, the device who’s IP address is
associated with the attacker’s MAC is a subnet gateway, allowing the
attacker to gain all information the victim is sending outside their subnet.
To make this a true Man in the Middle attack, the attacker must also
compromise the spoofed device’s ARP cache to allow for all data flowing to
and from the victim to be intercepted [11]. This attack can also be utilized
to cause Denial of Service.
(b) DNS Spoofing/Poisoning:
DNS Spoofing is when an attacker tries to send a victim a malicious DNS
packet containing the wrong IP address for a queried url [39]. The goal is to
give the victim an IP address controlled by the attacker in reply to a DNS
query. This causes the victim to connect to the attacker’s IP address when
visiting the queried url. The attack is then completed by forwarding the
victim’s data to the real website, allowing for the attacker to intercept all
traffic going between the two [11]. There are two ways for the attacker to
accomplish this attack, DNS cache poisoning and DNS hijacking.
i. DNS Cache Poisoning:
There are two types of DNS cache poisoning. The first is when an
attacker inserts a malicious DNS server into a network, causing the
victim to send DNS queries to the malicious DNS server [11]. The
malicious DNS server can then reply with whatever IP address that
attacker wants associated with different urls. This attack is possible
because DNS doesn’t use any authentication to confirm that a DNS
server can be trusted. The second is accomplished through sending a
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fake DNS reply before the real DNS server can respond to the victim’s
query [39]. This is possible because DNS packets are transmitted in
plaintext, allowing an attacker to sniff and read any DNS query. This
attack is riskier, because it relies on sniffing the query and sending a
fake DNS response before the real DNS server does, which is not
guaranteed to happen.
ii. DNS Hijacking:
This attack involves sniffing or intercepting DNS packets being sent
between the authoritative and recursive DNS servers [11]. The attacker
can do this through either of the two DNS cache poisoning attack types
to try to feed the authoritative server incorrect DNS information.
(c) DHCP Spoofing:
DHCP Spoofing is an attack where the DHCP protocol is used to achieve a
man in the middle through sending false DHCP information. Like DNS,
DHCP doesn’t have any authentication to create trust in a DHCP server.
Also like DNS, messages are transmitted in plaintext, allowing an attacker
to sniff and read any DHCP query [11]. There are two ways to accomplish a
DHCP Spoofing attack. The first is to try to respond to a DHCP request
faster than the real DHCP server [39]. The second is to set up a fake DHCP
server to send fake information to the victims. These both allow the
attacker to send incorrect information on the gateway address, the DNS
server, or even the victim’s own IP address [39]. Any of this information
would then allow the attacker to intercept the victim’s data and perform a
MITM attack.
(d) IP Spoofing:
IP spoofing is when an attacker intercepts communication between two
parties [11]. This can then be used to view all data sent through this
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communication. There are a few ways to intercept communications: blind
and non-blind spoofing, ICMP spoofing, and TCP hijacking.
i. Blind/Non-Blind Spoofing:
Both blind and non-blind spoofing can be used for data mining to
intercept communication, but can also be used for DDOS attacks [11].
In blind spoofing, the attacker has to send requests to the victim’s
network and can then analyze the transmission sequence [11]. In
non-blind spoofing, the attacker is in the same subnet as the victim,
allowing the attacker to sniff data such as sequence and
acknowledgement numbers [11].
ii. ICMP Spoofing:
Since ICMP has no authentication mechanism, the ICMP redirect
packet can be used to route a victim’s messages through a malicious
router [39]. The malicious router can then eavesdrop, modify, or drop
any packets.
iii. TCP Hijacking:
For TCP hijacking, the attacker either guesses or uses knowledge of a
server’s psuedo-number generator to predict a sequence number of an
existing TCP connection [11]. If one of the sequence numbers is guessed
correctly, the attacker takes control of the connection from the victim.
2. SSL/TLS MITM
SSL/TLS allows authentication of users and servers to prevent malicious
machines from spoofing [11]. It encrypts data to prevent any sniffing of
information or modification of packets. It also ensures data integrity so that even
if an attacker is able to modify data, it will be obvious that a change was made
and the packet will be dropped. All of that allows SSL/TLS to secure
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communication between two parties [11]. To intercept communication secured by
SSL/TLS, more complex attacks are necessary.
(a) Forge Certificate:
This attack involves using a forged certificate to create a man in the middle
between two parties using an SSL/TLS connection [11]. If the attacker
forges a certificate, they create an invalid cert and intercept the initial
exchange between the client and the server. The attacker then sends the
invalid certificate to the client and hopes the user ignores the cert
warning [11]. If the user accepts, the attacker can create a second connection
with the server and intercept data between the client and the server.
(b) Hijack Certificate
This attack involves using a hijacked certificate to create a Man in the
Middle between two parties using an SSL/TLS connection [11]. In this
attack, an attacker somehow obtains a valid certificate to a server or a
private key through malicious means [11]. The attacker could then create a
connection with the client with no cert warnings, since the certificate is
valid. The attacker could then create a second connection between itself and
server, acting as a man in the middle between the client and server.
2.1.2.2 Countermeasures
Detection and prevention of Man in the Middle attacks are much more
specific to each type of attack than DOS/DDOS detection and prevention. There
are many more specific solutions rather than general ones, so we don’t list all the
possible methods but rather list a few brief examples for each attack. In this section,
we list the different detection methods and countermeasures for each MITM attack.
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We give a brief description of each countermeasure without going into too much
detail. We start with measures for detection and countermeasures for ARP spoofing.
1. ARP Spoofing/Poisoning:
There are a few solutions to detect ARP spoofing. ARP-Guard and
ARP-Defender use network architectures utilizing sensors to detect the
attack [11]. ARPwatch tracks MAC-IP pairings to be able to detect if any
pairings are changed [11]. However, it only alerts admins if a suspicious change
has been made and doesn’t take any action itself. There are also cryptographic
solutions, such as S-ARP which authenticates ARP replies using public key
cryptography [11]. There is the voting based solution MR-ARP, which queries
neighboring machines to vote on new IP-MAC pairings [11]. There are hardware
solutions such as Dynamic ARP Inspection, which ensures the validity of ARP
requests and responses [11]. There is Antidote, a server-based solution, which
gives priority for an IP-MAC pairing to old IP addresses [11].
2. DNS Spoofing/Poisoning:
Cache Poisoning detection system is a system that uses machine learning to
detect DNS spoofing in real-time [11]. There is a P2P system that, similar to the
MR-ARP, uses a voting system to authenticate a DNS response [11]. There are
cryptographic solutions similar to ARP crypto defenses, such as DNSSEC which
uses cryptographic signatures to achieve data integrity and origin
authentication [11]. There is also an Artificial Neural Network solution that can
predict the reliability of DNS response packets [11].
3. DHCP Spoofing:
DHCP detection is mostly cryptographically based, such as SDSS and
SDDC [11]. There is also a hardware solution called DHCP snooping that acts as
a firewall between hosts and DHCP servers [11].
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4. IP Spoofing:
IPSec and Ingress Filtering are the two main methods that have been used to
prevent IP spoofing [11]. Ingress filtering filters packets at the border of an
Autonomous System and can use either Access Control Lists (ACLs) or unicast
Reverse Packet Forwarding [11]. There are router based solutions such as
Distributed Packet Filtering, Source Address Validation Enforcement, and
Spoofing Prevention Method. Distributed Packet Filtering filters based on packet
flow and interface used [11]. Spoofing Prevention Method inserts a tag into
packets that validates AS/prefix pairings [11]. Hop Count Filtering, a host based
solution, validates prefix and hop count pairings [11]. There is also the
cryptographic based Accountable Internet Protocol that validates correctness of
addresses [11].
5. SSL/TLS MITM:
There are many different ways to detect this attack. Detection of forged
certificates can be used, with Cert Transparency, ICSI, and Crossbear all doing
this. Crossbear actively scans the Internet to detect forged certificates [11]. Cert
pinning can also be used, where hosts are associated with certificates or public
keys [11]. Multi-path probing uses a distributed voting approach to authenticate
certificates [11]. Also, forcing SSL/TLS connection can be done to prevent
downgrade attacks, where the attacker makes the client or server not use
SSL/TLS [11]. There are also friendly MITM defenses that are used to secure
every new connection created [11].
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2.1.2.3 Tools
Unlike DOS/DDOS attacks, MITM tools are generally more catered to a
specific MITM attack. There are many available MITM tools for each attack. We
list a few tools and give brief descriptions of each.
1. Ettercap
Ettercap is a suite of tools that have the capability to do many different Man in
the Middle attacks. It can be used for ARP poisoning/spoofing and DNS
poisoning/spoofing [39]. It also has tools for hijacking connections, filtering
traffic, and sniffing SSH connections [39].
2. Dsniff
Dsniff, like Ettercap, is a suite of tools that can run different Man in the Middle
attacks. Like Ettercap, it can be used for ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and
sniffing [39].
3. Zodiac
Zodiac is a tool specifically used for DNS spoofing [39].
4. IRPAS icmp redirect and icmp redir
Both these tools are used specifically to pull off an ICMP redirect attack to
redirect a victim’s traffic through a malicious machine [39]. IRPAS can also be
used for route mangling, where an attacker presents the best route as one that
goes through a malicious machine [39].
5. Nemesis
Like IRPAS, this tool can be used for route mangling [39].
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2.2 Virtual Networks
Physical networks have the problem of lack of flexibility, both in the
difficulty of adding new services, such as firewalls and IDSs, to existing networks
and in moving those services around the network. The idea of Virtual Networks
were suggested as a solution to this lack of flexibility [17]. Virtual Networks are the
decoupling of network hardware and software, so that network services run purely in
software on top of the physical network [20]. When it was first suggested, the idea
was Virtual Networks could potentially allow for the ability to seamlessly add new
services, hosts, routers, etc., while also being able to move them around at will.
Today, we see that this is true. The decoupling of network hardware and software
allows applications and VMs to be connected to each other by a Virtual Network as
if it were a physical one [59]. Virtual Networks are also sometimes referred to as
Network Function Virtualization (NFV), which is the virtualization of network
components [29]. Virtual Networking is not to be confused with Software-Defined
Networking (SDN), which is the decoupling of the data and control planes of a
network [29]. In this section we give background on how Virtual Networks work and
how they are used. In section 2.2.1, we begin with a brief discussion on
virtualization. Then, in section 2.2.2, we discuss how virtualization is applied to
networks and how Virtual Networks work. We then discuss nested virtualization in
section 2.2.3, as it is utilized in our system design. Finally, in section 2.2.4, we
discuss the state of security in virtual networks.
2.2.1 Virtualization
Virtualization is the simulation of hardware function in software to allow for
the creation of a virtual computer system or virtual machines [59]. This allows for
the hardware resources to be divided up among virtual machines so that multiple
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Figure 2: After Virtualization [54]
computers or servers can be running on top of one physical machine. This creates a
benefit of flexibility and efficiency [59]. In this subsection we first describe
conceptually what virtualization is and then we go into basic details on how
virtualization is achieved.
Virtualization has many properties. Virtualization allows for different
operating systems to run on the same machine, even if they are not compatible with
each other. This is called partitioning and also includes the ability to divide the
physical machine’s resources among the VMs [59]. Virtualization also provides
isolation, where despite being on the same hardware, a VM’s memory can’t be
accessed by anyone other than the VM itself. Isolation also means “preserving the
performance of a VM with advanced resource control tools” [59]. Virtualization also
utilizes encapsulation, where the entire VM is saved as files and can be moved and
cloned very easily, similar to moving files [59]. Lastly, virtualization brings hardware
independence, where any OS can be used on any type of hardware, allowing for
great flexibility [59].
So how does this division of resources actually work? To allow for VMs to
share resources on a system, a special OS is needed to communicate with the host
machine to get access to the hardware resources and divide them among the VMs.
This OS is typically called a hypervisor. On top of the hypervisor are the VMs’
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Figure 3: Hosted Virtualization [54]
Figure 4: Hypervisor Virtualization [54]
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operating systems, which communicate with the hypervisor to gain access to
resources [54]. When a VM’s OS requests a resource from the hypervisor, the
hypervisor communicates with the host system to get access to the resource.
Figure 2 shows an example host with virtualized machines on top of it. There are
two main approaches to where the hypervisor is placed, hosted and hypervisor [54].
They are both very similar, with the key difference being that in the hosted
approach the physical machine’s OS remains, while in the hypervisor (also called
bare metal) approach, the host OS is replaced with a hypervisor [54]. The
hypervisor approach is more efficient, since the abstraction layer (the hypervisor)
has direct access to hardware resources, but the hosted approach allows the most
hardware configurations [54]. Figure 3 shows a hosted virtualization and figure 4
shows a hypervisor virtualization. Because a hosted approach leaves the original
OS, the machine can have both VMs and other applications running simultaneously.
Due to abstraction, VMs see their resources as physical, not knowing that they are
communicating with a hypervisor to get them [54]. This allows for VMs to function
like normal machines.
2.2.2 Network Virtualization
Network Virtualization works similar to machine virtualization, utilizing
hypervisors to abstract hardware and implementing hardware components in
software. Think of Virtual Networks as similar to a physical network but in
software, just like how a VM is similar to a computer but in software. In this
subsection we describe how Virtual Networks work and how they are used.
Virtual Networks generally are divided into two parts, the overlay and the
underlay networks. The underlay network is made up of the underlying physical
network components that communicate with each other physically, while the overlay
network is the Virtual Network with the virtualized network components and
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Figure 5: Simple Virtual Network [45]
VMs [21]. Figure 5 shows an example, basic Virtual Network. Network components
such as routers and switches are emulated in software to provide the layer 2 and
layer 3 functionality of physical networks. For example, a virtual switch (vSwitch)
has the same packet forwarding of a physical switch, but in software [45]. Similarly,
NICs are also emulated in software as vNICs, which are used for VMs. In figure 5,
the two machines each host 2 VMs and two vSwitches, with one of each belonging
to separate networks. Similar to a VM’s ability to preserve isolation and security on
the same physical machine, Virtual networks allow for VMs to be on separate
networks despite being on the same physical host or subnet [45]. They also allow for
VMs to be on the same network despite being physically far from each other.
To allow for VMs to be logically on different networks, something must be
done to prevent VMs and physical machines from looking at packets that aren’t a
part of their network. The solution is VXLAN, which acts similarly to VPN.
VXLAN is a MAC over IP encapsulation [21]. It is used to create virtual overlays
(or tunnels as it is called in VPN) across physical networks [45], preventing
components, both physical and virtual, from viewing packets that dont belong to
their virtual network. The vSwitches connected to the VMs in the virtual network
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act as virtual tunnel endpoints (VTEP) between NICs [45]. These VTEPs allow for
both physical and virtual components to create routes to send data between VMs.
VXLAN reduces the complexity of forwarding, allowing for routes to be created
based on the overlay network and having the physical network components simply
forward VXLAN packets to the correct VTEP [45]. With VXLAN, whole
datacenters can be virtualized [45].
So how are Virtual Networks used? Generally Virtual Networks are utilized
in data centers and service provider networks [45]. This allows them to create
networks based on certain application needs and then change the network topology
on the fly when the needs change. For now, those are the main use cases for Virtual
Networks. However, there have been other proposed applications such as in mobile
and home networks [17]. While Virtual Networks aren’t currently being used for
those applications, it is possible that in the future they will be.
2.2.3 Nested Virtualization
Creating a Virtual Network environment requires a full, underlying physical
network. But what happens if there is a lack of physical resources? For our system,
we need to create a Virtual Network environment that is contained within one
physical host. Despite the lack of physical network devices, this can be
accomplished with nested virtualization. Nested virtualization is when a hypervisor
runs one or more other hypervisors, each of which can run their own VMs [7].
Nested virtualization can have many uses, such as the ability of users to select their
own hypervisor and VM combination, or to allow hypervisors and VMs to be
migrated as a unit for load balancing or disaster recovery [7].
Hardware-assisted nested virtualization is a common way to achieve this.
Figure 6 shows an example of hardware-assisted virtualization and the three levels
of nested virtualization. In this figure, VMM is the hypervisor and L0 stands for the
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Figure 6: Hardware-Assisted Nested Virtualization Diagram from Nest-
cloud [40]
first level and so on. In normal virtualization the hypervisor runs in host mode,
having direct access to hardware resources, while the VMs run in guest mode [64].
When a VM tries to execute a privileged instruction that accesses hardware
resources, a control transition takes place from guest mode (VM) to host mode
(hypervisor), with the hypervisor executing the VM’s command for them. Once the
command is completed, the hypervisor relinquishes control back to the VM [64]. In
hardware-assisted virtualization, there is a second layer of virtualization. This
second layer makes both the nested hypervisor and the VMs operate in guest mode
(in separate contexts), while the underlying hypervisor is in host mode [64]. The
operations work similarly to normal virtualization, with the underlying hypervisor
acting as a middle man between the nested hypervisor and the VM. When a VM
requests a privileged hardware resource, a control transition takes place from the
VM to the underlying hypervisor. The underlying hypervisor then sends the request
directly to the nested hypervisor to process. Once the nested hypervisor has
processed the request, it sends the event to the underlying hypervisor to execute.
Once the event is complete, the underlying hypervisor relinquishes control back to
the VM [64]. This process allows for nested hypervisors to behave logically like a
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normal hypervisor on top of a physical host, when in reality the nested hypervisor is
dependent on another, underlying hypervisor. Using this technology, we are able to
use the nested hypervisors to act as physical hosts in our system.
2.2.4 Virtual Network Security
Virtualization changes the vulnerabilities of Virtual Networks as compared to
physical networks. While virtualization adds some protection, it also adds new
attack vectors, such as multiple Virtual Networks being able to share memory and
link resources [5]. It is important to realize what is gained and lost security wise in
respect to virtualization and Virtual Networks. However, overall, most of the
vulnerabilities of physical networks apply to Virtual Networks as well. In this
section, we look at security related to virtualization and Virtual Networks.
Specifically, we look at how security is changed, both positively and negatively, with
virtualization and how that affects Virtual Networks. We start with describing
virtualization security.
2.2.4.1 Virtualization Security
Virtualization allows for confidentiality and integrity of data, separating
VMs from each other despite being on the same hardware. However, there have
been cases of malware either breaking out of or in to a VM. There are two main
ways for an attacker to attack a VM: getting access to the VM from the host or
getting access to the host from the VM [62]. The first one is done through infecting
the host machine that the victim VMs are on. The attacker can then attempt to
breach VMs or create their own malicious VMs and launch them [62]. An example
of this is the W32.Crisis. This was an attack where malware infected a host machine
as a java file, which made its way onto the machine through social engineering. It
then utilized the ability to manipulate VMs through their stored files, adding itself
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to the VM so that the next time the VM was powered on, it contained the
malware [62]. The second threat is breaking out of a VM and getting access to the
underlying host. This is more dangerous, as breaking out of a VM could allow
malware to spread rapidly. It is also of great importance to prevent, as VMs are
sometimes used to inspect malware [62]. Cloudburst was an attack where malware
in VMs was able to execute commands on the underlying host [62]. This was
accomplished by using invalid instructions, which created exceptions. These
exceptions were then hijacked and then cached on the host machine, allowing code
to be created by the malware and executed on the host [62]. There is also the
possibility of shared folders being used to get from a VM to a host [62]. The best
way to prevent these attacks is to use hardening, malware protection, access control,
and other common computer protections [62].
2.2.4.2 Network Virtualization Security
Virtual Networks secure some of the vulnerabilities of physical networks, and
at the same time add some new vulnerabilities as well. However, they are just as
vulnerable as physical networks. The majority of network attacks work for both
physical and virtual networks. In this section, we look at the threats to Virtual
Networks and some general countermeasures. We list the categories of each and
describe some of the specific attacks and countermeasures briefly. We start with
Virtual Network threats and vulnerabilities.
For Network Virtualization, there are four broad categories of threats and
vulnerabilities: disclosure, deception, disruption, and usurpation [5]. Disclosure is
“unauthorized access to protected information” [5]. Deception is convincing other
devices that false information is actually true. Disruption is causing some part of
the system or communication to fail. Usurpation is gaining unauthorized control of
some part of the network [5]. Each category has further subcategories of
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vulnerabilities and threats for Virtual Networks. For each category, we list the
different subcategories and their examples, and give a brief description of each.
1. Disclosure
(a) Information Leakage
Information leakage is when some information from one Virtual Network is
able to be viewed by another, separate Virtual Network [5]. This occurs
because some part of the Virtual Network is leaking private information.
This attack may be done through ARP Poisoning [9]. If the attacker spoofs
an IP address in another Virtual Network, it may be able to gain
information that is supposed to be private to that network. Information
leakage could also be done by escalating privilege and getting root access to
a VM in the other Virtual Network [5].
(b) Information Interception
This is also called eavesdropping, where data being sent between two parties
is intercepted by a malicious device [5]. Again, ARP poisoning can be used
to achieve this attack. The attacker could also trick a physical switch or
router into sending data through a path that allows the attacker to sniff all
the packets being exchanged [5]. According to [14], some Virtual Network
environments may not correctly isolate data between different Virtual
Networks, allowing for sniffing of other Virtual Network information. Even if
that data is encrypted, the packets can be analyzed to derive some sensitive
information [5]. One could also use Virtual Network requests to discover the
physical topology of the network and certain routing information [5].
(c) Introspection Exploitation
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Introspection is used to confirm the states of VMs [5]. This can be exploited
to disclose information from VMs, since introspection allows external access
to information in the Virtual Network.
2. Deception
(a) Spoofing
This involves an attacker sending data with false information to make
another device believe that the attacker is someone else [5]. Virtual Network
environments complicate spoofing prevention because of the need to keep
track of multiple, overlapping Virtual Networks and the potential for
incompatible security policies over them [5]. An attacker could also
potentially remove a node and re-add it to a Virtual Network to get around
security mechanisms [5]. The ability to migrate and duplicate nodes further
complicates the prevention of spoofing and opens up more attack vectors.
(b) Replay Attacks
This is similar to a replay attack that takes place in a physical network.
Virtual routers may replay control messages to corrupt certain data [5].
3. Disruption
(a) Physical Resource Overloading/Failure
This can lead to virtual nodes crashing, congestion in Virtual Networks, and
prevention of tasks in Virtual Networks. An attacker could coordinate so
that one area of a Virtual Network requires too many physical resources to
split among the rest of the network [5]. It is also possible for one Virtual
Network to hog resources, depriving other Virtual Networks [2]. Because of
this, enforcing of minimum/maximum resource consumption is vital [5].
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DOS attacks on physical resources would also cause denial of service to the
parts of the Virtual Network located on the physical machine [5].
4. Usurpation
(a) Spoofing
Similar to spoofing under deception, except it can also be used to gain
escalated privileges [5].
(b) Software Vulnerabilities
As discussed in section 2.2.4.1, an attacker can find vulnerabilities in the
hypervisor and use those vulnerabilities to escape a VM and gain access to
the underlying physical machine [2]. This could give the attacker the ability
to disrupt one or more Virtual Networks as a result [5].
While there are a lot of threats to Virtual Networks, there are also ways to
protect the environment from those threats. There are 6 groups of countermeasures,
or security services: access control, authentication, data confidentiality, data
integrity, nonrepudiation, and availability [50]. Access Control is the same as an
Access Control List (ACL) or firewall, which can be used to determine under what
circumstances a node can access a resource. Authentication is used to confirm the
identity of a device [50]. Data Confidentiality makes sure information is only seen
by authorized devices [50]. Data Integrity ensures that any data in the network isn’t
unknowingly manipulated [50]. Nonrepudiation connects malicious actions with the
perpetrator(s) [5]. Availability means that devices always have access to
information that they are authorized to see [50]. For each category, we describe the
countermeasures that can be used and give a brief description of each. We don’t list
every countermeasure, as that would be too expansive, but rather only list a few
examples for each category.
1. Access Control
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(a) Trusted Virtual Domains
[8] is a framework that creates trusted virtual domains between virtual
machines. Each virtual domain is isolated from one another, providing
security in communications. A domain only allows a VM to join a group if it
meets certain criteria.
(b) Sandbox
Sandboxes can be used to prevent malicious (or any) VMs from accessing
resources outside of their own [5]. IPsec can be used to create secure,
cryptographic communications and X.509 can be use for authentication of
VMs [5]. The combination of the 3 can be used to secure a Virtual Network
2. Authentication
(a) Certificate based Authentication
Virtual Networks can use certificates to authenticate nodes joining the
network [5]. As stated before, X.509 can be used for authentication,
requiring new nodes to request a certificate from the CA. The certificate
given to the new node has its IP address in the certificate to prevent
spoofing and reuse [5].
(b) Key based Authentication
Keys can also be used to authenticate nodes in Virtual Networks. Similar to
physical networks, two devices can exchange keys to verify each other and
then use those keys to create encrypted communication [5].
3. Data Confidentiality
(a) Tunneling and Cryptography
As we discussed in section 2.2.2, tunneling protocols such as VPN or
VXLAN can be used to create isolated communication between nodes in a
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Virtual Network. They also utilize encryption to protect the data portion of
a packet from being snooped.
(b) Firewalls and Subnets
Firewalls can be used to prevent communication between Virtual Networks
or filter those communications [5]. Each individual Virtual Network can also
be bound to a subnet to provide some further security. Firewalls have large
use in physical networks and are useful and flexible in Virtual Networks. We
discuss the use of distributed virtual firewalls in our system design in
section 3.2.
(c) Path Splitting
Path splitting is where multiple paths are used to send information between
two nodes in a network [5]. This can be used to partially evade malicious
eavesdropping. If encryption is used, this can be helpful in preventing an
attacker from deriving meaningful information by analyzing flows.
(d) Limit Introspection
This would limit what the hypervisor could see in each VM [5]. This would
potentially protect against exploitations.
4. Data Integrity
(a) Encryption
Encryption can be used, as with pretty much every other category, to keep
data integrity [5]. Like with physical networks, cryptography is vital to
securing communications in Virtual Networks.
(b) Timestamps
Putting encrypted timestamps with packets prevents replay attacks from
taking place [5]. This is also commonly utilized in physical networks.
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5. Nonrepudiation
This is used to tie attacks to the malicious nodes that did them [5]. There is not
much currently in this area for Virtual Networks.
6. Availability
(a) Physical Resource Isolation
Isolating physical resources would prevent attacks where resources are
maliciously used up [2]. If malicious nodes can be prevented from
exhausting resources and the system divides the resources fairly, then
availability in the Virtual Network will be preserved.
(b) Virtual Network Resilience
Virtual Networks also have to be able to work around physical machine or
link failures [5]. Backups can be created for certain VMs to ensure
availability. Virtual Networks can also work around link failures, quickly
sending data through other paths, since the topology is flexible [5].
2.3 Virtual Network Architectures
With the storage needs of the world increasing, especially with the growth of
cloud computing, data centers are being utilized more than ever. The increasing
need of storage has led to more use of virtualization to help intra and inter data
center communications. The virtualization of physical networks is used to help
achieve this goal, but with the creation of Virtual Networks, systems must be
designed to create, manage, and secure them. A Virtual Network Architecture is the
system design for creating and maintaining virtual network components and the
resulting networks they create. Different companies design different Virtual Network
Architectures, with each having potentially different use cases. In designing a
Virtual Network Architecture, there are many questions about how different aspects
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of the system work. Questions such as how do network nodes communicate with the
management system, how are the data and control planes implemented, etc. Most
companies creating Virtual Network Architectures have multiple architectures that
they create based on different factors. One factor in creating different architectures
is the use of different virtual components, creating architectures that operate the
same except for their selection of virtual components. For example, VMware has
different architectures based on the types of virtual switches and routing
mechanisms utilized [55]. Another potential factor in differing architectures is the
potential needs and uses of the customer. For example, OpenStack has many
different architectures, ranging from classic implementations to high availability
implementations, based on the customer’s virtual network needs [34]. In this
section, we summarize and compare the main architectures of each company, as
covering every single architecture is repetitive. These architectures are used for
creating and managing Virtual Networks, some with different use cases, but most
with the purpose of creating and managing virtualized networks in large data
centers. The rest of the section is organized as follows. In subsection 2.3.1, we
discuss the Virtual Network Architectures, and how they are built and used. Then
in subsection 2.3.2, we compare the architectures based on their strengths and
weaknesses in different categories.
2.3.1 Enterprise Architectures
A Virtual Network Architecture dictates how a virtualized network is
managed, created, and functions. In this subsection, we look at different
architectures, how they work, how they are used, and their trade-offs. The
architectures include VMware vSphere architectures [57], including one that utilizes
Palo Alto Networks components [60], Juniper Networks’ Contrail Architecture [22],
OpenStack’s Neutron Architectures [34], Apache’s CloudStack Architecture [3], and
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the VirtualBox “Architecture” which isn’t a true Virtual Network Architecture [30].
We start first with the VMware Architectures.
2.3.1.1 VMware Architecture
VMware has two slightly different main architectures, with a third
architecture being based off the second architecture. Their difference is the use of
standard switches versus distributed switches, with the rest of the architecture
being based on this difference. Because of this we will describe both the standard
and distributed switch architectures (and the Palo Alto Networks variant of the
distributed switch architecture).
Standard Switch Architecture The vSphere Standard Switch Architecture allows
for the creation of an internal virtual network within each ESXi host. A standard
virtual switch is placed on top of each host and connects VMs to each other and the
external network outside of the host machine. In this section we describe the
different components of the architecture and how they work. Then we look at some
use cases and trade-offs.
The standard virtual switch (vSwitch) is more similar to a physical switch
than the distributed vSwitch, as it maintains both the data and management
planes [57]. Figure 7 shows an example of the Standard Switch Architecture and
how the components are connected. This architecture differs from the distributed
architecture as each standard vSwitch operates on a single host, independently of
one another. Because of this, each standard vSwitch implements both the data and
management planes of the network [57]. Standard vSwitches are configured and
maintained individually and are hosted on an ESXi host [57]. A vSwitch’s port
groups connect to a VM’s virtual NIC, providing connectivity to the other VMs on
the host [57]. These port groups can be assigned to any VMs on the same host as
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Figure 7: VMware vSphere Standard Switch Architecture [57]
the vSwitch, allowing for groups of VM’s to be managed together through a port
group’s specifications. All VMs connected to the same port group on a standard
vSwitch are in the same “network” or subnet, even if they aren’t on the same
host [55]. Figure 7 shows an example of different port groups, such as “Test
Environment” and “Production”, connecting to the vNICs of the VMs. The port
group labeled “Management Traffic” is connected to a component called the
VMKernel, with it’s own Virtual NIC called the vmknic. The VMKernel component
is “an adapter that is used to provide network connectivity to hosts and to
accommodate system traffic for features of the network such as fault tolerance and
IP storage” [57].
While vSwitches provide connectivity between VMs, they also can connect a
host and its VMs to the external network. They do this through a set of ports,
called uplink ports, which connect the ESXi host to some physical network
device [57]. The physical switch’s NICs are assigned to the uplink ports of the
standard vSwitch. An example of this is shown in Figure 7. A vSwitch provides
external network connectivity to the VMs on the host by connecting their port
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groups to the uplink port groups [57]. Figure 9 shows an example. However, if an
uplink port is not connected to a physical NIC, all VMs in the port group connected
to that uplink can only communicate with each other and not the external
network [57]. Each uplink port group on the standard vSwitch has the capability to
connect to one or more physical NICs. This is called NIC teaming and allows for
load balancing and a failsafe if a physical NIC goes down [57].
The vSphere Standard Switch Architecture is mainly used when a less
complex Virtual Network is needed, such as having ESXi hosts and VMs that need
to connect to each other in a way similar to a physical network. Other than basic
cases, there isn’t much reason to use the Standard Switch Architecture over the
distributed version. The Standard Switch Architecture is not as flexible as the
vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture and has less features as well. This is
because each standard vSwitch can only manage one host and must maintain that
host’s data and management planes for the internal network. Managing a VM as it
moves across hosts is not possible with a standard vSwitch and once a VM is moved
to a new host, any management or network preferences have to be recreated [57].
Distributed Switch Architecture The vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture is
more robust than the Standard Switch Architecture. The Distributed Switch
Architecture centralizes the management plane of the vSwitch so that the vSwitch
can be logically connected to multiple ESXi hosts, allowing for a more flexible
Virtual Network to be created [57]. In this section we describe the components that
differ from the Standard Switch Architecture and how they work. As with the
Standard Switch Architecture, we then look at the potential use cases and trade-offs.
The Distributed Switch Architecture has more functionality than the
standard switch version due to the distributed nature of the vSwitches. Figure 8
shows an example of the Distributed Switch Architecture. There are many
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Figure 8: VMware vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture [57]
differences between the standard and distributed vSwitches. Because the distributed
vSwitch is divided among potentially multiple hosts, it allows for the separation of
the data and management plane, unlike in the Standard Switch Architecture [57].
The data plane acts much like the data plane of a physical network and is
responsible for package switching, filtering, tagging packets, etc. In the Distributed
Switch Architecture, the data plane is still controlled at the host level, same as the
Standard Switch Architecture. The data plane component of a host in the
Distributed Switch Architecture is called the “host proxy switch” and is the part of
each host that receives the network configurations from the management plane [57].
The management plane is responsible for configuring the data plane, i.e. the virtual
switches and the hosts where the data plane resides [57]. However, in the
Distributed Switch Architecture, the management plane is now controlled by a new
component called vCenter, a virtual server. The configurations for a distributed
vSwitch are made in vCenter and then are stored locally in all the hosts that are
“connected” to the distributed vSwitch [57]. “By putting the management plane in
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a vCenter server, functionality of the network can be controlled at the highest
level” [57]. This is especially useful in data centers, where the configuration of all
the switches throughout the network can be controlled in one location [57].
The distributed vSwitch has a few differences in the data plane compared to
the standard vSwitch. Like the Standard Switch Architecture, the Distributed
Switch Architecture contains uplink ports on the hosts that connect to the NICs of
the physical switch. The difference between the uplink ports for each vSwitch is that
with the separation of the management and data planes, network configurations can
now be made for each uplink port group [57]. These configurations then propagate
down to all the host proxy switches that contain the uplink port group being
configured. Another difference in the data plane level is the addition of the
distributed port group. The distributed port group is similar to the port group used
in the standard vSwitches to connect the vSwitch to the VMs on the host [57]. As
with the standard vSwitches, the distributed port groups are identified with labels
such as “Production Network”. The difference between a standard port group and a
distributed port group is the latter can be connected to VMs on multiple hosts and
configured from vCenter to have different network settings. This allows certain
VMs, even if they are on different hosts, to share network settings by being
connected to the same distributed port group [57]. Different policies such as load
balancing, security, etc. for a group of VMs can be sent to the host proxy switch
and applied differently depending on the distributed port groups [57].
We have discussed the different distributed vSwitch components, but not yet
how they interact. Figure 9 shows a very helpful example of how the components of
an example distributed switch system are connected. The VMs and VMKernels on
each host are each connected to a port in their respective distributed port group. In
this example there is only one port group for the VMs and one for the VMKernels,
but there can be multiple port groups for each. Also, each VM, no matter which
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Figure 9: VMware vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture Data Flow Exam-
ple [57]
physical host it is on, can belong to any of the distributed port groups. Each
distributed port group is connected to one or more uplink port groups to allow for
external network connectivity. In figure 9, the “VM Network” group is connected to
two uplink port groups. The distributed vSwitch allocates an uplink port for each
physical NIC on the host. These uplink ports are then connected to their respective
physical NIC. In the figure, each uplink port group has two ports, one to connect to
Host1’s physical NICs and one to connect to Host2’s physical NICs. If Host1 had
another physical NIC, a 4th uplink port for Host1 would be created.
Data flow in the Distributed Switch Architecture is designed to allow for
redundancy to ensure that VM’s can communicate, even when a component is
failing. This is made possible by the ability to connect distributed port groups to
multiple uplink port groups, allowing for the use of multiple physical NICs to
transmit a VM’s packet. Figure 10 shows how a packet travels from a host out to
the external network. In the figure, the details of Host2 are omitted. For example, if
VM1 wants to send a packet out of the physical host, the packet would first go to
Port 0 in the port group “VM Network”. The packet then goes through either
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Figure 10: VMware vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture Packet Flow Ex-
ample [57]
uplink port 5 or 6, because both ports are connected to “VM Network”. If the
packet goes through uplink port 5, it then goes through the “vmnic0” physical NIC
of Host1; otherwise it goes through “vmnic1”. Through either of those Host1
physical NICs, the packet then goes to the physical switch, which can then forward
the packet to its next hop on the way to its destination. [57]
The vSphere Distributed Switch Architecture has more potential use cases
than the Standard Switch version, such as in data centers and cloud computing that
require more robust and available virtual networks [55]. The use of distributed
vSwitches and a central management server allow for more flexibility and more
available services. The ability to control the data plane of each host from a central
component allows for much more flexibility over a Standard Switch Architecture,
which requires configuring each host’s vSwitch individually. The ability to have
VMs on different hosts be a part of the same logical subnet is very beneficial,
because it allows for the creation of any Virtual Network Topology, which wouldn’t
be possible on a physical network. The distributed vSwitch allows for VMs to
maintain consistent network configurations even as they are moved across the
44
network to different hosts [57]. One downside to the architecture is that once a host
is connected to a distributed vSwitch, it must always be connected to some
distributed vSwitch. Another downside is the need to send the configurations of
each host over the network, which creates some overhead and has the potential for
failure. However, the overhead is small and done in increments [57]. Despite this,
the Distributed Switch Architecture allows for more flexibility and more features
than the Standard Switch Architecture. Compared to other architectures, both
VMware Architectures contain more options for use of virtual network, virtual
security, and distributed components. The virtual network and virtual security
components are created and managed by VMware’s NSX. NSX is the system for
creating and managing the distributed vSwitch, complex virtual networking
components, and virtual security components such as virtual firewalls [58]. NSX
allows for more complex network function virtualization. VMware is at an
advantage because they specialize in virtualization, making it easier to integrate
more robust virtual components. However, VMware’s architectures are limited to
managing the virtual components of a network and don’t allow for management of
physical network components. This means that other Architectures must be used
with VMware to manage a full Virtual Network system.
Palo Alto Networks + VMware Architecture The Palo Alto Networks (PAN)
VM-Series Architecture builds on top of the VMware vSphere Distributed Switch
Architecture to add more security features [60]. The PAN VM Series Architecture is
different from the other VMware architectures because of the integration of Palo
Alto Networks security components. The additions are few enough that the
architecture is similar to the Distributed Switch Architecture talked about above,
but the security components added are important enough that it deserves its own
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section. We first discuss the PAN components and then discuss use cases and
trade-offs.
VMware has its own virtual network security called NSX, but this
architecture allows for the additional use of 3 Palo Alto Networks components:
VM-Series Firewall, Dynamic Address Groups and Panorama Centralized
Management. “The VM-Series Firewall is a state of the art firewall that has the
functionality of a hardware firewall but is distributed and virtualized” [60]. The
firewall allows for the testing of unknown malware in a sandbox environment and
many other IDS type features which are absent in the previous VMware
architectures [60]. Dynamic Address Groups allow for the tagging of VMs. Because
VMs can be moved from one physical host to another, this allows for security
policies to be applied to VMs even as they travel across the network [60]. The
Panorama Centralized Management is a central management system for the
VM-Series Firewalls that allows for configuring devices, deploying security policies,
and performing analysis across all the virtual firewalls in the network [60].
These three additional Palo Alto Networks components added on to
VMware’s Distributed Switch Architecture creates a new, combined architecture.
Some of the things that could be improved about the Distributed Switch
Architecture are certain security aspects, such as the lack of visibility into intra VM
traffic and slowness [60]. This architecture greatly increases security for any Virtual
Networks created. The potential downside is the system will be made slower due to
another centrally managed component and the added overhead of all the security
utilized. However, the system isn’t slowed enough to harm the network and is
outweighed by the benefits of having the extra security added. The use cases for
this architecture are the same as the Distributed Switch Architecture, since the
network components of the architecture operate in the same way. The difference is
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simply the added security, which is beneficial in data centers, cloud computing, and
really any use case.
2.3.1.2 Juniper Contrail Architecture
Juniper Networks is a company that specializes in network solutions, both
physical and software-defined. A software-defined network is a network which
separates the control and data plane. A central controller makes the forwarding
decisions and propagates those decisions to the switches, which become simple
forwarding devices [25]. Juniper’s Virtual Network Architecture is called Contrail.
“Juniper Network’s Contrail is an open-source software-defined networking (SDN)
solution that automates and orchestrates the creation of highly scalable virtual
networks” [22]. Potential use cases are as a cloud networking platform and for
network function virtualization [22]. Contrail allows for the creation of overlay
virtual networks to allow for a separated distribution of physical and virtual
resources [22]. An overlay network is when the physical network is used to provide
connectivity, while the virtual networking components lay on top of the physical
servers routing the data [22]. In this section, we describe Contrail’s components and
how they work, followed by use cases and trade-offs.
Figure 11 shows the details of the Juniper Contrail architecture and how the
components are connected. While there are many components in the system, the
two main Juniper created components of the architecture are the SDN Controller
and its subnodes, and the vRouters. Contrail’s software-defined network controller
is used for management, analytics, and control mechanisms of the system [22]. It is
logically central, but is physically separate, meaning that the controller is hosted on
multiple physical servers, but is viewed by the rest of the network as one controller
when communicating with it. VRouters are similar to the VMware vSwitch that we
described earlier, except the vRouter also provides routing services [22]. The
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Figure 11: Juniper Contrail Architecture [22]
vRouter acts as a forwarding plane that lies in the hypervisor of a virtualized
server [22].
Contrail’s SDN Controller is divided into three main services: Configuration
Nodes, Control Nodes, and Analytics Nodes [22]. The configuration nodes are in
charge of the management plane and communicate using REST APIs. They
translate a high level data model into a low level model that can properly interact
with network elements [22]. The control nodes implement the logically centralized
portion of the control plane and are in charge of applying the changes made by the
configuration nodes. They propagate the low level model created by the
configuration nodes to and from network elements and peer systems [22]. This
communication is done using XMPP to control the vRouters and a combination of
BGP and NETCONF protocols to control the physical routers [22]. The analytics
nodes are in charge of collecting statistics for troubleshooting and network usage
stats. They capture real time data and turn it into a presentable form [22]. Contrail
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utilizes what is called an overlay virtual network, as described earlier. The vRouters
create tunnels between each other, so when a VM on one physical host sends a
packet to another, it can be routed without interacting with another overlapping
virtual network and without having its data being viewed by any unauthorized
routers/hosts on the way to its destination [22]. VMware’s Virtual Network
Architecture with NSX allows for similar functionality.
Other than the two Juniper components, there is also an orchestration
system for the virtual networking, which can utilize two other Virtual Network
Architectures discussed later, called OpenStack and CloudStack [22]. The
orchestration system is in charge of communicating with the virtualized network
functions such as virtual firewalls and virtual routing components. OpenStack and
CloudStack are Virtual Network Architectures like Contrail, but can be utilized to
simply manage a Virtual Network’s components, which is why they are used in
Contrail’s Architecture. Contrail also utilizes 3 main interfaces. The first is the
Northbound REST API that is used to talk to apps and the orchestration
system [22]. The second is the Southbound interfaces used to communicate with the
vRouters and the physical network elements [22]. Lastly, the East-West interface is
utilized for peer to peer communication, such as vRouters communicating with one
another [22].
Juniper’s Architecture utilizes many different forms of communication. The
overlay network’s messaging format is based on MPLS L3VPNs (for layer 3 overlay
networks) and MPLS EVPNs (for layer 2 overlays) [22]. Contrail’s virtual overlay
network data plane can utilize either MPLS GRE/UDP or VXLAN to create tunnels
of communication between vRouters [22]. The control plane utilizes BGP for
communication [22]. The protocol for communication between the SDN Controller
and the vRouters is very similar to and based off XMPP, and is semantically very
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similar to the BGP protocol [22]. We wont go into detail on how these protocols
work, as knowing how they work isn’t important to understanding the architecture.
Use cases for Contrail include as a Private Cloud for companies, as an
Infrastructure as a Service, as a Virtual Private Cloud for Service Providers and for
managing Network Function Virtualization for Service Provider Networks [22].
Contrail, like other Virtual Network Architectures, is utilized in data centers,
allowing for the creation of multi-tenant virtualized data centers [22]. Contrail
allows each tenant to share physical resources while being assigned their own virtual
resources, such as their own virtual networks, virtual storage, and VMs [22]. For
Network Function Virtualization, Contrail allows for management and orchestration
of virtualized functions such as firewalls, IDSs, caching, etc. Contrail’s strengths are
that it allows for multiple options in choice of Virtual Network Orchestrator and
type of virtual network components. It also utilizes overlay networks and tunneling,
allowing for logical separation of networks while keeping data protected. However, it
doesn’t have as much flexibility as the VMware Distributed Switch Architecture,
because its vRouters have similar shortcomings to the VMware Standard vSwitch,
such as only being able to connect to VMs on one host. Contrail also lacks in
security compared to the vSphere Architectures. While VMware has both NSX and
PAN distributed security features that can be managed from a central location,
Contrail’s only allows for the use of external security components. While other
security features such as IDS’s and Firewalls can be useful in the architecture, they
cant be distributed or centrally managed to more easily secure large parts of the
Virtual Networks created.
2.3.1.3 OpenStack Architecture
OpenStack is a company that created a Cloud Management System that can
control “large pools of compute, storage, and networking resources throughout a
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data center” [38]. The most important part of that system is virtual network
management and virtual components, which allow for the creation of virtual and
overlay networks. OpenStack Neutron has different architectures based on the needs
of the user, such as classic, high availability, and provider (overlay) networks [34].
Architectures also vary based on different components added or substituted, such as
architectures with and without a linux bridge. The primary use case for Neutron is
in data centers, where it is used to create and manage Virtual Networks similar to
the other architectures we have described [38]. In this section, we look at the Classic
Architecture with Open vSwitch, as it is the ”classic” architecture type for Neutron
and shows the base case for OpenStack Virtual Networking. We then briefly discuss
the High Availability with Distributed Virtual Routing Architecture and the
Provider Network Architecture to show the full capabilities of Neutron. We then
look at use cases and trade-offs.
OpenStack’s Neutron Virtual Network Architecture is used for controlling
the networking components of a Virtual Network. “It contributes the networking
portion of self-service virtual data center infrastructure by providing a method for
regular (non-privileged) users to manage virtual networks within a project” [34]. An
overview of the basic network layout can be seen in figure 12. The infrastructure is
made up of 3 main parts: a controller node, a network node, and one or more
compute nodes [34]. The controller node has one network interface and manages the
network. The network node has four network interfaces and acts as a router or a
gateway to the network. The compute nodes contain three network interfaces and
hosts the VMs. There isn’t much to say about the controller node, other than it is
used to manage the whole network, but there is more to the network and compute
nodes.
Figure 13 shows the overall architecture and components for the network
node. The network node is the most complex of the three nodes and is used as a
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Figure 12: OpenStack Virtual Network Basic Layout for a Classic Open vSwitch
Architecture [34]
sort of gateway router for the network, connecting subnets together and connecting
the network to the Internet [34]. It contains four main components: an Open
vSwitch agent, a DHCP agent, an L3 agent, and a Metadata agent [34]. The Open
vSwitch agent is in charge of managing all the virtual switches. It manages the
virtual switch’s connectivity and their interactions with other components through
its virtual ports. The Virtual switches interact with other components such as
namespaces, Linux bridges, and underlying interfaces [34]. The DHCP agent is in
charge of managing the qhdcp namespaces, which provide DHCP service to VMs of
the system using an internal network [34]. The L3 agent manages the qrouter
namespaces, providing routing between internal and external networks [34]. It also
provides routing between internal networks, allowing these networks to
communicate among each other. It also routes metadata between instances of the
network and the Metadata agent. The Metadata agent handles all the metadata
operations for all VMs of the network [34].
Figure 14 shows the overall architecture and components for the compute
node(s). The compute node is a host, similar to the VMware ESXi host, that can
host multiple VMs [34]. Multiple compute nodes can be connected as a subnet or
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Figure 13: OpenStack Virtual Network’s Network Node Design [34]
even one compute node can be considered a subnet itself. The compute node
contains a virtual switch for its hosted VMs to connect to and has two components.
The first component is another Open vSwitch agent that performs the same tasks as
described in the network node [34]. The compute node agent manages Open
vSwitches on the compute node, while the Open vSwitch agent in the network node
manages all the switches in the network. The other component is the linux bridge,
which handles security groups and their applications to the different VMs [34]. Due
to limitations with Open vSwitch and iptables, the networking service uses a linux
bridge to manage security groups for VMs [34].
Figure 15 shows an example of how the compute, controller, and network
nodes are all connected. In the figure, the network node is acting as the gateway
router, routing between compute nodes and from compute nodes to the external
network. The compute nodes act as subnets, with each having a switch to route
between instances. The figure also shows 2 overlapping networks that don’t know
about the other: the Tunnel network and the VLAN network. This is a good
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Figure 14: OpenStack Virtual Network’s Compute Node Design [34]
example of how virtual networks can be separate, even though they are on the same
physical machine.
A High Availability with Distributed Virtual Routing Architecture adds to
the Classic Architecture by adding distributed virtual routers [35]. Figure 16 shows
the overall architecture with the added distributed virtual router. The distributed
virtual router is added to every compute node, and compute nodes now have an
interface connecting them directly to the external network. This is done to allow for
direct connection to the external network and other compute nodes, bypassing the
network node [37]. The distributed virtual router also allows for address translation
for the Virtual Network on the compute node [37]. This is normally done by the
network node, but is now also done by the distributed router. The point of the
distributed router is to allow for quicker connection to other nodes and the external
network. The distributed router is also important because it makes Virtual
Networks more scalable by taking a lot of the load off of the network node and
distributing it [37].
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Figure 15: OpenStack’s Virtual Network Architecture and Components [34]
Figure 16: OpenStack’s High Availability using Distributed Virtual Router
Architecture [35]
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A Provider Network Architecture is similar to the Classic Switch
Architecture, but with the virtual components being connected to an underlying
physical network rather than directly to the Internet. The main difference is that
the Provider Network has the compute and control nodes connected to physical
network components such as routers, switches, etc. [36]. The controller and compute
nodes have interfaces that directly connect to ports on a physical network
component to allow for data to move through the overlay network [36]. Another
difference is that the network node and controller node are now combined so that
the controller node is now also partly responsible for network management [36]. The
Provider Network Architecture allows for the use of overlay networks and
communication inside and outside a Virtual Network, while the Classic Architecture
is more utilized for intra-data center communication between nodes, though
communication with external networks is still common [36].
The OpenStack Neutron Architectures allow for many different ways to
create and manage Virtual Networks and their components. This is shown in the
Juniper Contrail Architecture that we discussed, where OpenStack’s Architecture
can be used to control all the virtualized network components in the system. Like
other Virtual Network Architectures, the Openstack Neutron Architecture is mainly
used in creating virtual data center networks [36]. Neutron is useful because it has
many architecture types depending on the type of Virtual Network system that is
needed for a solution. The downside is that once one is selected, it is harder to
switch to a different architecture and one can’t reap the benefits of the different
architectures at once. Neutron also has an architecture that utilizes distributed
routers, which allows for more efficient intra-data center communication [37]. It also
makes the system scalable and efficient due to distributing some of the work done
by the network node, such as address translation [37]. Another downside is that
similar to Juniper’s Contrail Architecture, there aren’t as many security features as
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VMware’s Architectures outside of using normal network IDSs and virtual firewalls.
This is seen with OpenStack’s vSwitches having limitations that force the network
node to use a Linux Bridge to manage the security of VM groups.
2.3.1.4 Apache CloudStack Architecture
The Apache Software Foundation is a company that focuses on developing
open-source software. One of their projects is Apache CloudStack. “Apache
CloudStack is an open source cloud computing software, which is used to build
private, public and hybrid Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) clouds by pooling
computing resources” [27]. Like other architectures, the Apache CloudStack
Architecture is used in virtualizing datacenter communication. Apache CloudStack,
like OpenStack, has many architectures based on need and is used as an option for
managing network components in the Juniper Contrail Architecture. However,
CloudStack differs from OpenStack in that the different architectures it employs are
based on the size of the desired network and whether certain components, such as
storage, should be separated from the rest of the network. In this section, we first
describe the CloudStack Architecture and its components, followed by use cases and
trade-offs.
The Apache CloudStack Architecture allows for the virtualization and
management of data center networks. Figure 17 shows an overview of the general
CloudStack Architecture. CloudStack “supports a large set of hypervisors, scalable
architectures, multi node installation and load balancing, making it a high
availability system” [27]. However, the CloudStack Architecture has fewer
components and less functionality than the other Architectures we have covered,
with the basic architecture consisting mainly of a management server, storage, and
computing nodes. The management server is what manages the cloud resources
such as provisioning storage, hosts, and IP addresses [27]. Admins can use the
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Figure 17: Apache CloudStack’s Virtual Network Architecture and Compo-
nents [27]
management server through either a user interface or through its API. Storage has
the option of being located on a server within the same part of the network as the
other components or being separated into its own storage subnet [27]. The
computing nodes are the machines hosting the VMs and other virtual network
components [27].
CloudStack has a range of architectures from a very simple, small network to
more complex, more divided networks. The CloudStack Architecture has both basic
networking, similar to an AWS type network, and more advanced networking for
more complex network topologies [27]. Figure 18 shows the Small-Scale Deployment
Architecture, the most basic CloudStack Architecture [3]. The architecture has one
subnet with a gateway router/firewall, a layer 2 switch, a management server, an
NFS storage server, and the compute nodes holding the virtual resources [3]. It also
contains a VMware vCenter server if VMware virtual network components are being
used [3]. CloudStack has other architectures with more flexible setups, such as
architectures that divide certain components between different subnets.
The CloudStack Architecture allows for various Virtual Network setups
ranging from smaller to larger networks. CloudStack is mainly used in data centers
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Figure 18: Apache CloudStack’s Virtual Network Small-Scale Deployment [3]
and cloud computing to create and manage Virtual Networks, making intra data
center communication easier. A big benefit of the CloudStack Architecture is its
flexibility in component use. It allows the use of many different VM types, virtual
component types, and even the use of VMware’s vCenter to manage Virtual
Network resources (if the Virtual Network components are VMware’s). The
CloudStack Architecture also allows for more functional network setups, which allow
the architecture to handle bigger networks and/or the separation of storage nodes,
which helps lower the load of the management network. However, despite the
increased functionality of some of the Architectures, it still lacks in flexibility of its
implementations. The different architectures of CloudStack are based more on
division of storage than in creating more architectures of varying uses, unlike
OpenStack which allows for plenty of architecture options. The CloudStack
Architecture also lacks in use and management of virtualized security functions from
a central location. It doesn’t have any dedicated management for security and
instead relies on the use of outside virtual security components and management.
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This makes it more difficult to manage network-wide security and protect any
Virtual Networks created.
2.3.1.5 Oracle VirtualBox “Architecture”
Of all the Virtual Network Architectures, Oracle’s VirtualBox is the easiest
to describe. This is because it doesn’t really have a Virtual Network Architecture,
hence the quotations surrounding architecture in the heading. To create a Virtual
Network in VirtualBox, it is necessary to use regular VMs as virtual routers, rather
than using virtual switches that better emulate a physical switch. It also requires
personally creating a management network through VirtualBox’s network setting
and by enabling port forwarding [30]. Other steps to get the network properly
configured are needed as well. So while a Virtual Network can be created in
VirtualBox, it is more of a workaround than a true Virtual Network.
2.3.2 Architecture Comparisons
In this section we look at the overarching view of all the architectures and
shortly describe how they compare to each other in certain aspects. Each
architecture has similar use cases, mainly in data centers and cloud computing, and
each has its own trade-offs. No architecture is necessarily better overall than any
other, but rather each is better in different areas such as flexibility or management.
Table 1 shows an overview.
For flexibility of implementation, the VMware vSphere Distributed Switch
Architecture, the PAN VM-Series Architecture, and the OpenStack Architectures
allow for diverse choice in architectures based on different virtual network
components. However, OpenStack’s architectures vary and once one is picked, the
whole system is set. VMware and the PAN architectures, however, allow for
flexibility in choice of virtual switch, virtual security components, etc while also
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Architecture Implementation
Flexibility
Management Security and
Management
Virtual
Component
Flexibility
VMware vSphere +
PAN
Good, multiple
options for
vSwitch/security
Good management of
virtual network, lacks
physical network
management
Good, has many
distributed/centrally
managed security
features
None, must use
VMware virtual
components
Juniper Contrail Some, has only one
architecture, must use
vRouter
Manages both virtual
and physical, Others
manage virtual better
Relies on outside
virtual security
components
Very, allows different
hypervisors and
virtual components
OpenStack Good, has multiple
architecture and
virtual component
options
Same as VMware,
virtual management
slightly worse
Relies on outside
virtual security
components
None, must use
OpenStack virtual
components
CloudStack Some, has different
architectures based
on network division
Same as Juniper Relies on outside
virtual security
components
Very, can use different
hypervisors and
VMware vCenter
Table 1: Architecture Comparison Overview
allowing for them to be implemented at any point in time. CloudStack allows for
the use of VMware network virtualization, so through that capability it also allows
for some flexibility of architecture. The Contrail Architecture has some flexibility,
but not as much as the other architectures, being limited by its lack of options for
virtual switch (vRouter must be used) and virtual security components.
For management of a network, each architecture has its strengths and
weaknesses. Juniper Contrail and CloudStack allow for management of both virtual
and physical resources, while VMware and OpenStack don’t. However, VMware and
OpenStack allow for better management of virtual components and both allow for
the distribution and central management of switches and subnets. This allows for
the management of a VM’s network configurations even as it moves around the
physical network. For integration of security and easy management of it, VMware
has the clear edge with its Distributed Switch Architecture, along with NSX and the
PAN architecture. The vast options for virtual security through NSX and PAN puts
the VMware and PAN architectures above the rest. The other architectures all rely
on outside security components and don’t provide centrally managed Virtual
Network security.
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CloudStack and Contrail allow for the most flexibility in type of hypervisors
and virtual components used, with CloudStack being a little more flexible in this
regard due to the Contrail Architecture needing to use its own virtual router.
CloudStack is also flexible in that it allows for the use of VMware’s vCenter to
manage the VMware virtual components. Juniper also allows for the choice between
CloudStack and OpenStack for managing virtual resources. VMware/PAN and
OpenStack are not flexible in this category as they require use of their own virtual
components.
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Chapter 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
To test the idea that dynamic topology changes can be used to secure a
Virtual Network, we must set up a system to show the potential effects. An
important part of that system is creating a Virtual Network environment for
testing. To do this we use VMware’s virtual technology, which we explain in detail
in section 2.3.1.1. VMware allows for a vast amount of options for virtualized
network and security components, making the creation of a viable environment
easier. It is flexible and, since we won’t need to manage physical devices, it makes
the most sense for creating our Virtual Network environment. Besides setting up a
virtual environment, it is also necessary to simulate situations in which our dynamic
defenses could be used as protection. We accomplish this through the use of Kali
Linux and its many attack tools, which we use to run network attacks. We also set
up a detection system, using the open source Snort IDS, to alert when an attack is
happening. The alert is used to initiate our dynamic defenses. Finally, we
implement virtual security components that are used in the dynamic defenses for
securing the Virtual Network, which leverages VMware’s NSX. In this chapter, we
detail how our system is built by describing our Virtual Network environment, the
security components utilized for our dynamic defenses and how they are set up, how
we run the network attacks, and how we detect those attacks. In section 3.1, we
describe how we created all the hypervisors, VMs, and other virtual components in
our environment and how they are set up. In section 3.2, we discuss the creation
and setup of NSX and our virtual security components, which we utilize for our
dynamic defenses. In section 3.3, we discuss our network attacks and how they are
run using Kali Linux. Finally, in section 3.4, we look at the setup of the Snort IDS,
which is used to detect the network attacks in our experiments.
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Figure 19: Topology of Host Virtual Network
3.1 Virtual Network Setup
In this section, we describe the setup of the Virtual Network environment
from start to finish. We detail the creation of VMs, hypervisors, networks, and
other components in our virtual environment.
To create our Virtual Network environment, we use VMware’s vSphere and
vCenter technologies, which are used for the creation of Virtual Networks. As
described in section 2.3.1.1, vSphere is used to create Virtual Network components
on top of an individual host and vCenter is used to centrally manage all the Virtual
Network components for all the hosts. To store our system, we use a physical DELL
machine with 12 CPUs, hyperthreading capabilities, approximately 1 TB hard disk,
and 100 GBs of memory. The machine has a VMware ESXi hypervisor installed on
it to allow for the creation and management of VMs. Figure 19 shows the topology
of the Virtual Network environment on top of the physical host. The physical host
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also has 4 NICs and is connected to a physical switch, which is connected to the
gateway of the subnet. Only one NIC is utilized for our system for network
connectivity, with a second NIC being used as a backup in case of failure. The host
uses an internal DHCP server in a separate subnet, and an external cal poly DNS
server called “larry” and the google DNS servers. The host also contains a standard
virtual switch to allow external network connectivity for all the VMs. All created
VMs are connected to the “VM Network” standard port group, while the VMKernel
is connected to its own “Management Network” standard port group.
On top of the physical host we install a vCenter Manager, which is used to
manage our Virtual Network environment. It is given an initial 40 GB hard disk
and 10 GBs of memory, all of which is thin provisioned. Thin provisioning is when
only the amount of memory needed at the time of creation is allocated for a
VM [53]. More storage can then be added afterwards as needed. So for our system,
even though the VM is given a 40 GB hard disk, only the part of the 40 GBs that is
currently needed is allocated. All VMs created in our system use thin provisioning,
since it allows for more flexibility in memory usage. Once the vCenter Manager is
created, the web GUI can be accessed and used to create other VMs on top of the
physical host. The vCenter management GUI can be accessed through a web
browser by entering the IP address of the vCenter Manager. The vCenter Manager
is the main tool we use to create and manipulate our Virtual Network environment.
On the vCenter Manager, we create 3 different “clusters” of machines.
Figure 20 shows the vCenter layout with the 3 clusters. Clusters are used to
abstract multiple machines as one entity, combining their resources into one
cluster [56]. This is generally done for datacenters. However, since our environment
wont be dealing with datacenter-like activity, we will use them to organize our VMs
rather then to group resources. We create 3 clusters: a “mgmt-cluster” which holds
the physical host and all the vms created on it, a “compute-cluster” which we use as
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Figure 20: VCenter GUI and Clusters Layout
the internal network for our experiments, and an “external-cluster” which is used to
hold other VMs that are not a part of the “internal network”.
In a real Virtual Network, VMs and Virtual Networking components are
created on top of many hosts and physical network components. However, this is
very time intensive and requires a lot of physical resources that we do not have.
Instead, we use nested virtualization to emulate a Virtual Network environment on
a single physical machine. In section 2.2.3 we explain how nested virtualization
works. With VMware nested virtualization, there is an outer guest VM and an
inner guest VM. The outer guest, or the guest hypervisor, is an ESXi hypervisor
VM which runs on the physical host, on top of the main ESXi hypervisor [32]. The
inner guest is the nested VM that runs on top of another VM (the hypervisor
VM) [32]. The nested hypervisors can be managed in the exact same way as a
physical host’s hypervisor, through vSphere’s web GUI. This web GUI is accessed
by entering the IP address of the ESXi hypervisor in a web browser. A nested ESXi
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hypervisor VM can be added to a vCenter cluster as a host and acts as a physical
host when interacted with through vCenter. After it is added as a host, VMs can be
added to and run on the nested hypervisor.
To use nested virtualization to emulate a real Virtual Network system, we
must first create the nested ESXi hypervisor VMs that will act as physical hosts.
Each hypervisor VM is created on top of the real physical host and put in the
standard port group “VM Network” to provide external network connectivity. In
the vCenter view, the hypervisor VMs are placed in the “mgmt-cluster” with the
main ESXi host (the physical machine) and the vCenter Manager. They can then
be added to other clusters as “physical” hosts, which is what allows for nested
virtualization. Once the hypervisors are added as hosts to the clusters, VMs can be
created and “stored” on them. 5 ESXi hypervisor VMs are created in the
“mgmt-cluster”, with 4 being added to the “compute-cluster” as hosts and 1 being
added to the “external-cluster” as a host. Each host created from the hypervisor
VMs is given a 40 GB, thin provisioned hard disk, 8 GBs of memory, and 2 CPUs.
Of the 4 hosts added to the “compute-cluster”, 2 utilize a standard vSwitch
and standard port groups. The host on the “external-cluster” also utilizes a
standard vSwitch. The other two hosts on the “compute-cluster” are connected to a
distributed vSwitch called “DSwitch1”. Figure 21 shows an example of the
distributed switch’s network topology. The distributed vSwitch allows for all VMs
that are on a host connected to the distributed vSwitch to be in the same
distributed port group. It also has the ability to utilize a distributed firewall, which
we describe in section 3.2.
After creating the hypervisor VMs and adding them as hosts to the clusters,
the VMs that act as the clients, servers, etc. are created on top of the emulated
hosts. To allow for nested virtualization, the underlying physical host must have
hardware-assisted virtualization enabled. However, if the physical host doesn’t have
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Figure 21: Distributed vSwitch Topology
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this capability, nested virtualization can still be done by using 32 bit VMs instead of
64 bit ones. We choose the later option to simplify things. There are 4 types of
VMs in our system: a client, an attacker, a server, and an IDS. We discuss the IDS
in detail in section 3.4. We describe the other 3 here. For the server, a 32 bit,
headless, mini Ubuntu VM is created. It has a 2 GB hard drive, 512 MBs of
memory, and 1 CPU. Not much is stored on the server for the experiments, so using
a headless, mini Ubuntu instance works well. For the client, not much memory or
processing power is needed. Because of this, we initially looked at very lightweight
VMs and decided to use the 32 bit Damn Small Linux OS, requiring only a 128 MB
hard disk. However, we soon realized that a VM of that size was too small to be
compatible with the VMware Virtual Network environment, as extra space is
necessary to install certain tools needed to run commands remotely. Instead, we
settled on using another 32 bit, headless, mini Ubuntu VM. The client is given the
same specifications as the server. For the attacker, it is desirable to have a VM
containing many built in network attack tools, making the process of compiling
those tools much easier. Kali Linux is an OS that is specifically used because of its
vast quantities of attack tool frameworks. A 32 bit, mini Kali Linux VM is used to
create the attacker. The mini installation allows for customization of tools, requiring
much less memory usage than a full Kali Linux VM. The attacker is given an 8 GB
hard disk, 1 GB of memory, and 1 CPU. The “hping3” and “dsniff” packages are
installed to get the network attack tools that are used in our experiments.
3.2 Security Design
Once the vCenter environment is set up, security components need to be
added to be able to defend against the network attacks for our experiments. For
some of the dynamic defenses, we utilize VMware’s virtual, distributed security
components. To use them, we install VMware’s NSX. In this section, we discuss the
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creation and setup of NSX security and networking, and the security components
that will be used as a part of the dynamic defenses.
NSX allows for the use of advanced networking and security components,
such as virtual gateways, logical switches, logical routers, etc. It also allows for the
use of a distributed firewall and it is used to create the distributed vSwitch
connected to the two hosts in the “compute-cluster”. An NSX Manager VM is
created on top of the physical host, where it is connected to the “VM Network”
standard port group. In the vCenter view, it is placed in the “mgmt-cluster”, where
it has a full network view. To make hosts compatible and connectable with NSX
components, the clusters containing the emulated hosts are selected to install the
necessary NSX tools.
Two security components we heavily utilize in our system: the distributed
firewall and spoof guard. The distributed firewall works like a normal firewall,
except it is purely in software and is distributed similar to the distributed vSwitch.
Any host or VM that is connected to a distributed vSwitch or that is in a cluster
that has downloaded the NSX tools is covered by the firewall. Figure 22 shows the
layout of the distributed firewall and example rules. The distributed firewall allows
for very fined grained control of rule creation. For source and destination of packets,
anything from a distributed port group to a whole datacenter can be selected. For
our experiments, only distributed port groups or clusters (or “any”) are selected for
source and destination. There is also the ability to create a new definition of service
type, by specifying the packet type and the parameters needed to trigger the
firewall rule. Generally, we select the packet type of the attack being run. Finally,
an action is selected: allow, drop, or block. For our firewall rules, block is always
selected to activate enforcement of the rule.
The other component we utilize is spoof guard. Figure 23 shows an example
of a spoof guard policy. Spoof guard is used to prevent VMs from spoofing MAC or
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Figure 22: The Distributed Firewall GUI and Example Rules
Figure 23: The Spoof Guard GUI and Example Policy
IP address information. To enforce spoofing protection, a new spoof guard policy is
created. The port groups, or other components that should have spoofing
protection, are specified in the policy. All the VMs in the connected port groups
have their initial addresses registered. The spoof guard then checks all the packets
coming from those port groups and if an address doesn’t match the registered
address, the packet is dropped. This prevents the VMs being monitored by the
spoof guard from spoofing MAC or IP addresses.
3.3 Attack Design
For the validation of our dynamic virtual network, it is necessary to run real
network attacks to test the feasibility of our security methods. To vary the testing,
we use a few different categories of attacks to create a diverse set of experiments. In
total, 6 different attacks are utilized: TCP Syn Flooding, ICMP Flooding, Smurf
Attack, ARP Spoofing, DNS Spoofing, and NMAP Scanning. In this section we go
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over how each attack is run in our system. We provide detailed explanations of each
attack in section 2.1.
3.3.1 TCP Syn Flooding
TCP Syn Flooding is an attack where many TCP Syn requests are sent to
use up a server’s TCP resources, preventing or slowing other clients from creating
new TCP connections [43]. We run the attack using the Kali Linux tool “hping3”,
which is used for running dos and ddos attacks. The command to run the attack is
“hping3 -S –flood [victim-ip]”, where the -S flag specifies that the attack should
utilize TCP Syn packets and the –flood flag specifies the attack should send as
many packets as fast as possible.
3.3.2 ICMP Flooding
ICMP Flooding is an attack where many ICMP packets are sent to a
machine to try to use up bandwidth on that machine’s links, preventing other data
from traversing those links [31]. We also run this attack with hping3, using similar
flags as the TCP Syn Flooding attack. The command to run the ICMP flood is
“hping3 –icmp –flood [victim-ip]”, where the –icmp flag is used to specify that the
flooding attack should utilize ICMP packets.
3.3.3 Smurf Attack
A Smurf attack is when many ICMP requests (Ping requests) are sent to
many different machines with the source address spoofed as the victim server’s IP
address [43]. The machines that receive the pings then send many ping responses to
the victim server, with the goal being to cause a denial of service. We also run this
attack with hping3, using similar flags as the ICMP Flooding command. The
command to run the Smurf attack is “hping3 –icmp –flood -a [victim-ip]
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[broadcast-ip]”, where the first two flags are the same as the ICMP Flood command.
The -a flag is used to specify the victim’s IP address, which is used as the source
address of the ping requests. The IP address at the end of the command specifies
the broadcast address of a subnet, so that the request can be sent to all the
machines in that subnet.
3.3.4 ARP Spoofing
ARP Spoofing is an attack where a malicious device modifies the victim’s
local ARP cache table so that another machine’s IP address is associated with the
wrong MAC address [11]. Generally the MAC address to be inserted belongs to the
attacker, allowing for the attacker to intercept data going from the victim to that IP
address. We run the attack using the Kali Linux tool “arpspoof”, which is designed
specifically for ARP poisoning/spoofing. The command to run the attack is
“arpspoof -i eth0 -r -t [victim-ip] [gateway-ip]”. The -i flag specifies the interface to
run on, which in our case is “eth0”. The -r flag specifies that the attack should
poison the ARP cache tables of both of the IP addresses specified, allowing for the
attacker to intercept all data going between the two devices. The -t flag specifies the
victim to poison and the last IP address is the IP we want associated with our MAC
address in the victim’s ARP table. We ended up taking out the -r flag for the
purposes of our experiments, since poisoning the gateway’s ARP table would have
taken too long. We ended up using the command “arpspoof -i eth0 -t [victim-ip]
[gateway-ip]” to poison the victim server’s ARP table with the gateway’s IP address
and the attacker’s MAC address.
3.3.5 DNS Spoofing
DNS Spoofing is an attack where an attacker impersonates a DNS server,
either by setting up a rogue DNS server or by intercepting DNS requests and trying
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to reply before the real DNS server can [11]. For our experiment we use the latter
method, intercepting DNS requests from the victim and responding with a forged
DNS response. We also use ARP poisoning to make sure the request is never sent to
the real DNS server, causing the victim to always receive the forged DNS response.
For the ARP poisoning, we use the same command as we just described in
section 3.3.4. Since the DNS server we use is outside of our physical host’s subnet,
all DNS request packets are sent to the gateway to forward to the DNS server. ARP
spoofing causes the victim to send all data destined for the gateway to the attacker,
meaning the real DNS server will never receive the DNS requests from the victim.
We run the DNS Spoof attack with the Kali Linux tool “dnsspoof”. The
dnsspoof tool takes a file specified by the user, saying which websites to spoof and
which IP address to spoof it with. Once it is run, it starts sniffing for DNS request
packets that are querying for any website that is contained in the file. If one is
found, dnsspoof generates a DNS response packet for that website with the spoofed
IP address specified in the file. The command to run the DNS Spoof attack is
“dnsspoof -f [filename]”, where the -f flag specifies the filename. The format of the
file is “[ip-address] [url]...”, where each line contains an IP address/url pairing. For
our experiments, the spoofed IP address is always set to the IP address of the
attacker.
3.3.6 NMAP Scanning
NMAP is a tool that uses raw IP packets to gain information about other
machines, such as whether they are up or not, ports, operating system, etc [33]. It is
generally utilized to gain information about a subnet or network. We use the
NMAP tool to run a basic scan of a single victim, getting information on whether
the machine is up, which ports are open, and the machine’s MAC address. The
command to run the nmap scan is “nmap [victim-ip]”. We run the command on one
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victim host to simplify the attack and make the scanning faster for the purposes of
the experiments.
3.4 Detection
To make our experiments more realistic, there needs to be a way to detect
the network attacks being run. Once they are detected, the dynamic responses can
be used to try to protect the virtual environment from the attacks. To detect these
attacks, we use an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which can catch attacks based
on packet signatures. For each attack, a rule is created in the IDS to catch it. We
create a headless, mini Ubuntu VM similar to the server and client. It is given 8 GB
for a hard disk and 1 GB of memory. Snort is then installed on the VM. In this
section, we describe the creation of the IDS, the setup done, and the rules created
for each attack. We begin with the IDS creation.
For our IDS we use Snort, an open source intrusion prevention system that
does real-time analysis of packets and logs information [49]. Though Snort has the
capability for attack prevention, it is used in our system purely for detection. Setup
of Snort is simple and can be easily replicated. Because Snort is so widely available,
it can be downloaded with an “apt-get install snort” command. Everything is set to
the defaults, with the only edits being in the configuration and rules files. The
“snort.conf” file is used for configuration of the Snort detection engine, while the
“local.rules” file contains detection rules similar to a firewall. In the configuration
file, all the automatically included rules are removed, leaving only the path to our
rules file. We set the configuration file to log all alerts in plaintext. Then, in the
rules file, the rules for detecting attacks are placed. Once everything is set up, Snort
is started by running the “service” command. If any changes are made to any files
affecting Snort, they only take effect once the IDS is restarted using the “service”
command.
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To detect the attacks for our experiments, we need to create detection rules
so that Snort can send an alert that an attack has been detected. Figure 24 shows
our Snort rules in “local.rules”. Each rule creates a set of criteria that a packet or
flow must meet for it to be considered an attack. If that criteria is met, an alert is
logged to the file “alert” and the packet is stored in libcap format in a file
“tcpdump.[random number]”, where “[random number]” is replaced with some
randomly generated number. For the experiments, only one rule is ever used at a
time to lower overhead. The first 3 rules correspond to the TCP DOS, ICMP DOS,
and Smurf attacks. All 3 rules are very similar with only slight differences. The 3
rules specify that if any one source sends more than 1000 packets per second of the
specified packet type, either tcp or icmp, then it is considered a DOS attack and an
alert is created. The 4th rule is to detect NMAP scan attacks. It uses a set
classification, built into Snort, for what a scan attack is and the “{}” is replaced
with the attacker’s IP address. This is done to avoid detecting numerous other
machines in the system that must scan the network. Due to the way the system is
set up, it is not possible to put a range of IP addresses, because it most likely would
include a VM that needs to scan the Virtual Network environment. In a realistic
system, the “{}” could be replaced with a range of IP addresses of machines that
shouldn’t need to scan the network. The 5th rule is used to detect DNS Spoof
attacks and was taken from an existing rule set. The rule checks to see if any packet
with an IP address outside of the internal subnet and using port number 53, the
DNS port, is sent to an address in the internal subnet. If the packet matches that
criteria, the body of the packet is checked for the contents given in the rule. The
contents help differentiate between a real DNS packet and a fake one. If the packet’s
contents match the rule, an alert is sent out.
Since ARP packets are at layer 2 of the OSI model, while the rest of the rules
check packets at layer 3, the ARP rules require being checked earlier in Snort’s
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Figure 24: Snort Rules for Attack Detection
Figure 25: Snort Rules for ARP Spoofing Detection
system. To check ARP packets, a preprocessor rule is used to check the packet
before it is sent to Snort’s rules engine [4]. The preprocessor rules are created in the
configuration file, under the preprocessor section. Figure 25 shows the ARP
preprocessor rules. The ARP rules set IP-MAC pairings that the preprocessor
should check on. If an IP or MAC that is listed in the pairings is found with a
different IP-MAC pairing, Snort sends an alert that there is a mismatch. The
“-unicast” rule detects if there are any unsolicited ARP replies being sent, and if
any are detected an alert is sent out. Currently the preprocessor alerts don’t give
any information on IP or MAC when ARP Spoofing is detected, since it is not yet
officially supported. We assume that the in the future, Snort’s ARP Spoofing
detection will list the attacker’s IP address in the alert, since the spoofed ARP
packet has the malicious node’s IP address anyways.
For the experiments, the created logs are retrieved to confirm that the attack
is detected. For all the attacks other than the DNS Spoof and Smurf attacks, only
the alert file is needed to confirm the attack and get the attacker’s IP address. For
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Figure 26: Virtual Network Overview with Nested Hosts and VMs
DNS Spoof detection, the alert file is used to confirm the attack occurred and the
“tcpdump.[random number]” file is used to get the spoofed IP address contained in
the malicious DNS reply packet. To convert the ‘tcpdump.[random number]” file to
plaintext, the command “tcpdump -r [filepath]” is used and the output is redirected
to a file. The spoofed IP address of the url is then retrieved from the output and
used to get the attacker’s IP address. For the Smurf attack, since the IP address is
spoofed, we assume that the attacker’s IP address is determined through other
methods. Note that the attacker’s IP address is only needed for the experiments
where the attacker is moved rather than the server.
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Chapter 4
DYNAMIC DEFENSE DESIGN IN VIRTUAL NETWORKS
Now that we have described our system setup, we move on to the design of
the dynamic defenses. To test the validity of our theory that Virtual Network
flexibility can be used for network security purposes, we create a set of experiments.
These experiments set up different scenarios and utilize different dynamic defenses.
In this chapter we look at the dynamic defenses, how they are set up, and how the
experiments are run. We divide this chapter into two sections: Dynamic Defenses
and Measurements. In section 4.1, we describe the four dynamic defenses, as well as
list the topologies used and the steps taken in running each experiment. In
section 4.2, we describe how we quantify the success of a dynamic defense against
each of the 6 network attacks used in our experiments.
4.1 Dynamic Defenses
Our defenses are divided into two groups of general defenses, Server
Protection and Attacker Prevention, each of which utilize different virtual security
components and scenarios. The Server Protection defense detects an attack
targeting a server and moves that server to a protected location. Attacker
Prevention defenses detect a malicious node and shift the attacker and topology to
protect network. Each group of defenses has a set of experiments that are run for
every attack (excluding one group of experiments that only runs the MITM attacks)
and are run independently of each other. In this section, for each defense and the
corresponding experiments, we describe the dynamic defense, the topologies used,
the attacks used, and list the individual steps for each experiment. We also explain
the real world scenario that each experiment is trying to replicate. We start with
the Server Protection experiments.
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4.1.1 Server Protection
Server Protection is a defense where an attack is detected against a server
and the topology is shifted to protect that server. In this situation there is an
insecure subnet and a secure subnet. Perhaps it is too resource intensive to put
protections on the whole network, so only a subset of the network has heavier attack
protections. The insecure subnet is a standard port group on a standard switch,
while the secure subnet is a distributed port group with protections in the form of
rules on the distributed firewall and spoof guard policies. The setup is such that the
attacker is in an external/separate network or isn’t yet identified and thus can’t be
touched. Once an attack is detected, the server is moved to the secure subnet to
protect against the attacker and any future attacks. We test this defense with a set
of experiments that vary based on the attack and the defense, which is based on the
attack type, used. In this section, we first describe the topology used, followed by
the defenses for each attack, and finally the steps for running the experiment.
For the experiments for the Server Protection defense, only one topology is
used, containing one client, attacker, IDS, and server. Figure 27 shows the topology.
The attacker is placed on standard host 5 in the external cluster, which represents
the “external network” or “separate network”. The server and the IDS are placed
on standard host 1 in the compute cluster or the “internal network”, with the IDS
being connected to a different standard port group than the server. For the DOS
attacks, a client is placed on standard host 2 in the compute cluster. Each VM is
connected to an independent standard port group. The secure subnet, which the
server is moved to in the experiment, is a distributed port group called
“ProtectedPG” on distributed host 3 and is connected to a distributed vSwitch.
How the secure subnet is protected varies based on the attack. For the
distributed port group there are two possible types of protection, distributed
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Figure 27: Topology for Server Protection Experiments
firewall rules and spoof guard. We go through each attack and describe which
protections are used and how they are set up.
1. TCP DOS attack
To protect against the TCP DOS attack, the distributed port group
“ProtectedPG” and the distributed firewall are used. To add protection to
“ProtectedPG”, we create a firewall rule saying that any TCP packet going from
the external cluster to the port group is dropped. Figure 28 shows the firewall
rule. There is the possibility that there are clients in the external network who
need to connect to the server. In this case, firewall rules can be created to allow
verified users/clients to connect to the server using a whitelist. Once the server is
moved to the secure subnet, the attack should be prevented, allowing clients to
create connections with the server uninterrupted.
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Figure 28: Firewall Rules for Protection from ICMP Dos, TCP Dos, Smurf and
NMAP Scan Attacks
Figure 29: Firewall Rule for ARP Spoofing Prevention
2. ICMP DOS and Smurf attack
Protecting against both the ICMP DOS and Smurf attacks is very similar to the
TCP DOS attack, but with slightly different firewall rules. The distributed port
group “ProtectedPG” is protected by a firewall rule saying that any ICMP
packet going from the external network to the port group is dropped. A rule is
also created saying ICMP packets can not be sent from the network subnet to
the distributed port group to protect against the Smurf attack. Figure 28 shows
both rules in the distributed firewall. Unlike with TCP, it isn’t a big concern if
an external network can not send ICMP packets to an internal network.
However, if it is needed for some reason a whitelist can be used. Once the server
is moved to the secure subnet, the attack should be protected against, allowing
clients to create connections with the server uninterrupted.
3. ARP Spoof attack
To protect against the ARP spoof attack, a new protection must be used for the
distributed port group “ProtectedPG”. Using a firewall rule targeting the
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Figure 30: Spoof Guard Protection for DNS Spoof and ARP Spoof Attacks
external network specifically wont always help protect against spoofing, because
a firewall rule relies on the information in the packet being correct. Spoofing
would be able to get around most rules because the packet being sent has
incorrect information. To protect against this, it is necessary to use the
distributed firewall’s spoof guard. A policy can be created with spoof guard to
protect the “ProtectedPG” port group from receiving packets with spoofed IP
addresses, MAC addresses, etc. Figure 30 shows the spoof guard being applied to
the distributed port groups and the VMs in those port groups. We also create a
firewall rule preventing ARP packets from be sent from the external-cluster to
the server, which is shown in figure 29. Once the server is moved to the secure
subnet, it should be protected from ARP poisoning, preventing the server’s data
from being intercepted by the attacker.
4. DNS Spoof attack
Protecting against the DNS spoof attack is the same as protecting against ARP
spoofing. Spoof guard is used to protect the “ProtectedPG” distributed port
group because a firewall rule would be ineffective against a DNS Spoofing attack.
With spoof guard protecting the secure subnet, the DNS Spoof attack should
fail, protecting the server from illegitimate url information.
5. NMAP Scan attack
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To protect against the NMAP scan attack, firewall rules are used to protect the
distributed port group “ProtectedPG”. Because the basic NMAP scan uses
ICMP and TCP packets to gain information, firewall rules are created to drop
any ICMP and TCP packets going from the external network to the distributed
port group. Figure 28 shows the firewall rule. Like the DOS attack protections, if
certain clients in the external networks need to use those protocols, a whitelist
can be used. With the protections on the secure subnet, the server should be
protected from scanning once it is moved.
We now list the steps of the experiment:
1. Set up the topology as described above
2. Select one of the attacks listed for this experiment
3. Set IDS rule for detecting the attack
4. Set firewall rule for protecting against attack to “block” that type of traffic
5. Using the measurement procedure for the selected attack, as described in
section 4.2, run the pre move and attack (if is DOS attack) measurements
6. Check if attack is detected before running post move measurements
7. If attack is detected, move server to distributed host 3 and connect the server to
the protected distributed port group “ProtectedPG”
8. Finish measurement procedure by recording post move measurements
9. Clean up by moving server back to original host and standard port group
10. Write measurements to file, save average for each measurement type
11. Sleep for five seconds
84
12. Repeat steps 1-11 20 times
13. Get average for all 20 runs for each measurement type and write it to file
14. Repeat for all attacks
4.1.2 Attacker Prevention
Attacker Prevention is a defense where a malicious node is detected and then
dynamically contained. For each example of attacker prevention, a secure subnet is
created and the attacker is moved to it to prevent any further attacks. The setup of
each experiment is such that the attacker is in the internal network and can be
moved around. Once an attack is detected, the attacker is moved to the secure
subnet to stop the attack. There are 3 different types of experiment groups under
Attacker Prevention, each named by the dynamic defense used: Isolated Subnet,
Distributed Port Group, and Standard Port Group. For each one, we describe the
topology used, followed by the attacks run and the corresponding defenses, and then
the steps for running each experiment. We start with the Isolated Subnet
experiments.
4.1.2.1 Isolated Subnet
Isolated Subnet is a defense where a malicious node is detected and moved to
a port group that is isolated from the rest of the network, similar to a black hole.
This isolated subnet is a standard port group that is given a unique VLAN so that
it cannot communicate outside of its port group. Because the attacker is the only
VM in the standard port group, it can’t communicate with any other device. Note
that the assigned VLAN must be a unique value not contained in any other port
group using VLAN trunking. The defense is unrelated to attack type, since being
cut off from communication should stop any attack. In the rest of this section, we
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describe the topologies used, list the attacks and the defense, and describe the steps
for the experiment for this defense.
For this defense, two topologies are used, each containing one client,
attacker, IDS, and server. Figure 31 shows the two Isolated Subnet topologies. In
the first topology, all the VMs are contained in the compute cluster, or the “internal
network”. The attacker and client are placed on standard host 2 in the compute
cluster, while the server and IDS are placed on standard host 1, also in the compute
cluster. Each VM is on an independent standard port group, even if they are on the
same host. The isolated subnet which the attacker is moved to is a standard port
group that is dynamically created on the same host and standard vSwitch as the
attacker. The newly created standard port group is given a random VLAN to
isolate it from the rest of the world. The second topology is almost identical to the
first, except the client is moved from the compute cluster to standard host 5 on the
external cluster or “external network”. The second topology is only used for the
experiments using DOS attacks, as only those experiments require the use of a
client. The isolated subnet is the same for both topologies.
The following attacks are used in this experiment and all are defended by the
isolated subnet in the same way:
1. TCP DOS attack
2. ICMP DOS attack
3. Smurf attack
4. ARP Spoof attack
5. DNS Spoof attack
6. NMAP Scan attack
We now list the steps of the experiment:
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Figure 31: Topologies for Isolated Subnet Experiments
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1. Set up the first topology as described above
2. Select one of the attacks listed for this experiment
3. Set IDS rule for detecting the attack
4. Using the measurement procedure for the selected attack, as described in
section 4.2, run the pre move and attack (if is DOS attack) measurements
5. Check if attack is detected before running post move measurements
6. If attack is detected, create isolated subnet
7. If isolated subnet is created, connect attacker to it
8. Finish measurement procedure by recording post move measurements
9. Clean up by moving attacker back to original standard port group
10. Write measurements to file, save average for each measurement type
11. Sleep for five seconds
12. Repeat steps 1-11 20 times
13. Get average for all 20 runs for each measurement type and write it to file
14. Repeat for the second topology if selected attack is of type DOS
15. Repeat for all attacks
4.1.2.2 Distributed Port Group
Distributed Port Group is a defense where a malicious node is detected and
moved to a distributed port group with protections on it. The distributed port
group utilizes the distributed firewall and spoof guard for this attack prevention.
The defense is almost identical to the Protected Server defense. The key difference
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is that the firewall rules and spoof guard target the port group of the attacker
rather than the server. In the rest of this section, we describe the topologies used,
the attacks and the defenses used against them, and then describe the steps for the
experiment.
For this defense, two topologies are used, each containing one client, attacker,
IDS, and server. Figure 32 shows the two Distributed Port Group topologies. In the
first topology, all the VMs are contained in the compute cluster, or the “internal
network”. The attacker is placed on distributed host 4 and is connected to a
distributed port group, which is connected to the distributed vSwitch. The server is
placed on distributed host 3 and is connected to a different distributed port group,
which is also connected to the distributed vSwitch. The attacker and the server are
on different distributed port groups and neither is connected to the protected
distributed port group. Similar to previous experiments, the IDS is on standard
host 1 and the client is on standard host 2, both connected to different standard
port groups in the compute cluster. The protected subnet which the attacker is
moved to is a distributed port group called “DPG2” and is on the same distributed
vSwitch as the attacker and server. The second topology is almost identical to the
first, except the client is moved from the compute cluster to standard host 5 on the
external cluster or “external network”. The second topology is only used for the
experiments using DOS attacks, as only those experiments require the use of a
client. The protected distributed port group is the same for both topologies.
How the distributed port group is guarded depends on the attack, similar to
the Server Protection experiments. For the distributed port group, two types of
protection are used, the distributed firewall rules and spoof guard. We go through
each attack and describe which protections are used and how they are set up.
1. TCP DOS attack
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Figure 32: Topologies for Distributed Port Group Experiments
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Figure 33: Firewall Rules for Prevention of ICMP Dos, TCP Dos, and NMAP
Scan Attacks
To prevent the TCP DOS attack from happening, a protected distributed port
group “DPG2” is created. To protect “DPG2”, a firewall rule is created saying
that any TCP packet originating from the the distributed port group is dropped.
Figure 33 shows the firewall rule. Once the attacker is moved to the distributed
port group, the attack should be prevented, allowing clients to create connections
with the server uninterrupted.
2. ICMP DOS and Smurf attack
Preventing both the ICMP DOS and Smurf attacks is very similar to the TCP
DOS attack, but with slightly different firewall rules. The distributed port group
“DPG2” is protected by a firewall rule saying that any ICMP packet originating
from the distributed port group is dropped. A rule is also created saying ICMP
packets can not be sent from the distributed port group to the broadcast IP
address of the network to protect against the Smurf attack. Figure 33 shows both
rules. Once the attacker is moved to the distributed port group, the attack
should be protected against, allowing clients to create connections with the
server uninterrupted.
3. ARP Spoof attack
To prevent the ARP spoof attack, a new protection must be used for the
protected distributed port group “DPG2”. As discussed earlier, spoofing can get
around the distributed firewall rules. Figure 30 shows the spoof guard policy used
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on the distributed port group. Spoof guard is used to prevent any VM connected
to the distributed port group from spoofing its IP or MAC address. Once the
attacker is moved to the distributed port group, it should be protected from ARP
poisoning, preventing the server’s data from being intercepted by the attacker.
4. DNS Spoof attack
Protecting against the DNS spoof attack is the same as protecting against ARP
spoofing. Spoof guard is used to prevent any VM connected to the distributed
port group “DPG2” from spoofing addresses. With spoof guard on the
distributed port group, the DNS spoof attack should fail, protecting the server
from illegitimate url information.
5. NMAP Scan attack
To prevent the NMAP scan attack, firewall rules are used to prevent scanning
behavior. Because scanning uses ICMP and TCP packets to gain information,
firewall rules are created to block ICMP and TCP packets coming from the
distributed port group. Figure 33 shows the rule. With the protections on the
distributed port group, the attacker should be prevented from scanning once it is
moved.
We now list the steps of the experiment:
1. Set up the first topology as described above
2. Select one of the attacks listed for this experiment
3. Set IDS rule for detecting the attack
4. Set firewall rule for protecting against attack to “block” that type of traffic
5. Using the measurement procedure for the selected attack, as described in
section 4.2, run the pre move and attack (if is DOS attack) measurements
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6. Check if attack is detected before running post move measurements
7. If attack is detected, move attacker to protected distributed port group
8. Finish measurement procedure by recording post move measurements
9. Clean up by moving attacker back to original distributed port group
10. Write measurements to file, save average for each measurement type
11. Sleep for five seconds
12. Repeat steps 1-11 20 times
13. Get average for all 20 runs for each measurement type and write it to file
14. Repeat for the second topology if selected attack is of type DOS
15. Repeat for all attacks
4.1.2.3 Standard Port Group
Standard Port Group is the defense with the smallest attack coverage. It is a
defense where a malicious node is detected and moved to a standard port group
with spoof protections on it. The port group is created with promiscuous mode and
MAC spoofing set to reject, theoretically preventing spoofing attacks. Since the
defense is spoof based, only the MITM attacks are used for this experiment. We test
this defense with a set of experiments that are the same for all the attacks. In the
rest of this section, we describe the topologies used, list the attacks and the defense,
and describe the steps for the experiment.
For this experiment only one topology is used, containing an attacker, IDS,
and server. Figure 34 shows the Standard Port Group topology. No client is needed,
since all the attacks are MITM attacks. In the topology, all the VMs are contained
in the compute cluster, or the “internal network”. The attacker is placed on
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Figure 34: Topologies for Standard Port Group Experiments
standard host 2 in the compute cluster, while the server and IDS are placed on
standard host 1, also in the compute cluster. Each VM is on an independent
standard port group, even if they are on the same host. The protected subnet which
the attacker is moved to is a standard port group that is dynamically created on the
same host and standard vSwitch as the attacker. The standard port group is
created with promiscuous mode and MAC spoofing set to reject rather than accept.
The following attacks are used in this experiment:
1. ARP Spoof attack
2. DNS Spoof attack
We now list the steps of the experiment:
1. Set up the topology as described above
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2. Select one of the attacks listed for this experiment
3. Set IDS rule for detecting the attack
4. Using the measurement procedure for the selected attack, as described in
section 4.2, run the pre move measurements
5. Check if attack is detected before running post move measurements
6. If attack is detected, create standard port group with promiscuous mode and
MAC spoofing set to reject
7. If standard port group is created, connect attacker to it
8. Finish measurement procedure by recording post move measurements
9. Clean up by moving attacker back to original standard port group
10. Write measurements to file, save average for each measurement type
11. Sleep for five seconds
12. Repeat steps 1-11 20 times
13. Get average for all 20 runs for each measurement type and write it to file
14. Repeat for all attacks
4.2 Measurement
To be able to compare the effects of the dynamic security measures, it is
necessary to have a way to numerically determine how successful an attack is. What
determines success varies by attack and thus the way we measure success must be
determined for each attack type. The Denial of Service attacks are all similar
enough that they can be measured in the same manner. However, the rest of the
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attacks are different enough that they each need to be run differently and therefore
measured differently. In this section, we look at how each attack is set up, run, and
quantified in our experiments. Note that what we describe for measuring each
attack (even when saying that it is repeated) is only considered one run of an
experiment. Each run is repeated multiple times for each experiment as we explain
in section 4.1. We first look at quantification of success for the DOS/DDOS attacks.
4.2.1 DOS/DDOS Attacks
In this section, we first discuss the setup for the DOS attack experiments and
how a measurement is derived from running the attacks. Then, we explain the
repetition used to create the dataset, which is considered one run of an experiment.
Our DOS attacks are all run in a similar manner and have the same goal.
Because of this, we are able to use the same set up and measurement for all three
attacks. Section 3.3 shows how the three DOS attacks are run using Kali Linux
tools. To measure the effects of the DOS attacks, we utilize a client, a server
(victim), and an attacker. Since the goal of the DOS attacks are to slow down or
deny access to the server’s resources, we can determine success by measuring the
time taken to get a resource from the server. To measure attack success, we
determine the time in seconds it takes for the client to download an approximately
32 MB file (filled with random characters) from the server. If for some reason the
download can not be completed, the time taken is set to 100 seconds. On average a
normal download of the file for a client takes about 0.5 seconds, so 100 seconds is
relatively large. This will raise the average download time significantly to show that
the download was stopped, but not move it to an unnecessarily large value.
To run and time the download, we use two bash scripts placed on the client.
Putting the commands in bash scripts allows the download to be triggered remotely
through the command line. Figure 35 shows the two bash scripts. The first script is
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Figure 35: Client’s Bash Scripts
used to download the file using wget and check whether the download was
successful. It takes three variables: the IP address of the server, the name of the file
to download from the server, and the name of the file to store the download’s
success. The second script is used to time the download, using the time tool, and
takes the same three variables as the first script. Only the second script needs to be
run, since it calls the first script. Both scripts reside on the client and the second
script is run to cause the client to download a file from the server and time it. The
success and time taken are output to a file on the client. The information is then
remotely retrieved from the client.
To create the dataset for one run, we first measure the time taken for the
client to download the file from the server without any attack running. This is
called the “baseline” or “pre move” measurement and is repeated 10 times. Then,
the DOS attack is run targeting the victim server and again we measure the time
for the client to download the server’s file. This is called the “attack” measurement
and again is repeated 10 times. Finally, the dynamic defense takes place and the
DOS attack is run again while the client downloads the file from the server. The
measurement, called the “post move” measurement, is then repeated 10 times. The
pre move, attack, and post move measurements are each retrieved from the client
and averaged to get 3 different, average download times. The pre move averages
serve as a baseline for how fast a normal transmission of data is between the client
and the server. This is then used to compare to the attack and post move averages
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to see how effective the dynamic defense is. We further explain how this comparison
is used to determine effectiveness in section 5.
4.2.2 MITM/Scan Attacks
The measurement of the MITM and Scan attacks vary by attack, unlike the
DOS attacks which all are measured in the same manner. Despite the differences in
how each attack is run and quantified, the range of values for the MITM/Scan
attacks is always between 0 and 1. A 1 signifies a completely successful attack and a
0 signifies a failure. A decimal value between 0 and 1 means an attack is partially
successful. All the MITM and Scan attack experiments require only an attacker and
a server, with no client necessary. In the rest of this section, we look at how we
quantify the success rate of the ARP spoof, DNS spoof, and NMAP Scan attacks.
We first describe the setup and how each attack success is measured, followed by
how the measurements are repeated to constitute one run. We start with describing
the ARP Spoofing quantification.
4.2.2.1 ARP Spoofing
Measurement of ARP spoofing requires only the use of a server and an
attacker, as stated above, with no client needed. Section 3.3.4 explains how the
attack is run. The goal of the attack is to successfully poison the server’s ARP
cache table. This is done so that data sent from the server to the subnet’s gateway
is instead sent to the attacker. Originally, we planned to try to poison the ARP
table of the gateway as well. However, poisoning the gateway of the subnet was not
possible due to time constraints on our experiments. Initially, the measurement
would be derived from ARP poisoning the server and using tcpdump to confirm
that the data was being sent to the attacker instead of the gateway. However, we
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Figure 36: Example of ARP Table Output for Victim Server
realized that since we have access to the server as well, it would be easier to simply
check the ARP table for the forged MAC address.
To measure the attack, we look to see if the gateway’s IP address is in the
ARP table containing the attacker’s MAC address. Figure 36 shows example output
of a server’s ARP table. The command “arp” is run on the victim server and the
output is redirected to a file. The ARP table contents are then retrieved from the
file to check for success. If the MAC address in the gateway’s entry is the attacker’s
MAC, then the attack succeeded and is given a value of 1. Otherwise, it failed and
it is given a value of 0. To create the dataset, we first run the attack before the
dynamic defense is initiated and measure the outcome. This is called the “baseline”
or “pre move” measurement, which is then repeated 10 times. Once the dynamic
defense is initiated, the attack is run and measured again. This is called the “post
move” measurement and is also repeated 10 times. The pre move and post move
measurements are then averaged and are considered one run of an experiment.
4.2.2.2 DNS Spoofing
DNS spoofing requires similar measurement to ARP spoofing, but is run
differently. The goal of the attack is to make a machine think that a url is
associated with the attacker’s IP address. Section 3.3.5 explains how this attack is
run. At first we attempted to run the DNS spoof without using ARP poisoning.
This proved difficult, because if the DNS request is still sent to a real DNS server
the attacker must respond to the request before the real server. With cached urls
this rarely happens. Even when we tried finding obscure urls, requesting them too
99
Figure 37: Example Nslookup Output
many times would get them cached locally, making it very uncommon for our attack
to beat the real DNS server. We ended up settling on running the ARP spoof attack
before running the DNS spoof attack. This prevents the DNS request from reaching
a real DNS server. We also decided to completely randomize the urls sent by the
victim server, making the process of selecting urls automated. This automation is
necessary to be able to repeat the attack many times, preventing the need to
manually select many different urls. We randomize each url by using a random
number generator and converting each number to a lowercase, english alphabet,
ASCII character. This is then repeated 5-15 times to create a domain name, with
“.com” being added to the end of the string to create the full url.
To measure the attack, we have the server run the command “nslookup
[random-url]” and redirect the output to a file. Figure 37 shows an example
nslookup output. The file’s contents are then remotely retrieved to examine the
result. If the returned IP address matches that of the attacker’s, then the attack
succeeded and is given a value of 1. Otherwise, if the IP address doesn’t match, it is
given a value of 0. Same as with ARP spoofing, the measurements are called “pre
move” and “post move” and are repeated 10 time and averaged. This is considered
one run of an experiment. The pre and post move averages can then be used to
measure the effectiveness of the security measure used to protect against the attack.
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Figure 38: Example NMAP Output from Attacker
4.2.2.3 NMAP Scanning
While NMAP Scanning is not a MITM attack, it is still measured in a
similar manner. Section 3.3.6 shows how the attack is run. The goal of the attack is
to gain information about a machine(s) and to learn more about a network or
subnet. Figure 38 shows example output of running nmap on the attacker. This
output is redirected to a file and later retrieved from the attacker to check for
success. For simplicity, we decided we would only run the basic NMAP command on
one victim server. Scanning is a little more complex to measure, since it is possible
to get a range of information. Because of this we couldn’t rely on only using values
of 0 and 1. We discovered that with some defenses the scan can still detect the
server as up, but can’t detect the port information. Since the only open port on our
server is ssh, we use that to determine whether the scan is fully successful. If the
scan is able to determine the state of the victim and its port information, a value of
1 is given. If the scan detects a host is up but doesn’t have the ssh port (meaning it
had no port information), a value of 0.5 is given. If the scan timed out or said the
host is down, a value of 0 is given. Same as with the MITM attacks, the
measurements are called “pre move” and “post move” and are repeated 10 time and
averaged. This is considered one run of an experiment. They can then be compared
to determine the validity of the dynamic security measure used.
101
Chapter 5
RESULTS
After running the experiments, we compiled the average for each dynamic
defense for the pre move, attack (if a DOS attack was used), and post move
measurements of success. For each result, we look at how much the success rate
shifts based on the dynamic defense mechanism. For the experiments with a DOS
attack, the difference between the attack measurement and the post move
measurement is the most revealing, though the difference between all 3
measurements reveals something about the success of the defense. The difference
between the attack measurement and the post move measurement shows how
effective the defense mechanism was in directly stopping the attack. The pre move
measurement is used as a baseline to compare against both the attack and the post
move measurements. The pre move success rate informs how much the post move
rate is above the norm, further identifying the effectiveness of the dynamic defense.
Without the pre move measurement, there would be no way of knowing if the
defense slowed down the attack only slightly or completely prevented it. For the
MITM/Scan experiments, since there are only the pre move and post move
measurements, the only comparison that is needed is the pre move success rate vs
the post move success rate. The pre move success rate acts as both the baseline and
the attack measurement, removing the need for both a pre move and an attack
measurement. Comparing the pre move to the post move success rate shows how
effective the dynamic defense was in defending the attack. In this chapter, we look
at the results of the four defenses, as described in the previous chapter, and analyze
them. The results for each defenses are divided up into two categories, DOS
experiments and MITM/Scan experiments, which are analyzed separately. We start
with the results and analysis of the Server Protection defense, followed by the three
Attacker Prevention defenses.
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Figure 39: Results for Server Protection DOS Experiments
5.1 Server Protection
The Server Protection defense involves shifting a server to a location behind
a firewall, protecting it from either a malicious node that is yet to be detected or an
external attacker. In this section, we look at the results of the Server Protection
defense and analyze them. We divide the analysis into two categories: DOS and
MITM/Scan experiments. We begin with the DOS experiments.
Figure 39 shows the results of the defense for the DOS attacks. The graph
shows the average number of seconds it took for a client to download an
approximately 32 MB file from a server for the pre move, attack, and post move
measurements of each DOS experiment. The three DOS experiments are the ICMP
DOS, TCP DOS, and Smurf experiments. For all three experiments, the baseline
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(pre move) measurement stays around 0.5 seconds. For the ICMP DOS experiment,
the average download time increases staggeringly to 3.7 seconds once the ICMP
DOS attack is launched, but before the dynamic defense is initiated. This
constitutes a 628% increase in download time. Once the server is moved behind the
firewall, the average download time plummets to 0.35 seconds, even faster than
baseline time. While we are not sure why the average download time is faster than
the baseline, though we think it has something to do with the baseline measurement
being slower than expected, this shows that the dynamic shift of the server
unequivocally protected it from the ICMP DOS attack. The TCP DOS attack
shows a similar result, though the avg download time for the attack measurement is
1.26 seconds instead of 3.70 seconds. The Smurf attack experiment, however, shows
slightly different results. While the average download time increases from 0.55
seconds to 1.35 seconds, a 143% increase, the dynamic defense only lowers the
average download time to 0.88 seconds. The post move measurement is a 37%
increase over the baseline (pre move) measurement. So while the firewall does
somewhat protect the server from the Smurf attack, it does not do so fully. This is
most likely due to the fact that a Smurf attack utilizes spoofing, something that the
distributed firewall can not protect against. Even utilizing the distributed firewall’s
spoof guard wouldn’t be effective, since it isn’t aware of the attacker or its
addresses. Despite the ineffectiveness of the firewall, it is still able to at least slow
down the Smurf attack, lowering the download time by 53%.
Figure 41 shows the results of the defense for the MITM/Scan attacks. The
graph shows the average success rate for each attack, as described in section 4.2.
The three MITM/Scan experiments are the DNS Spoof, ARP Spoof, and NMAP
Scan experiments. For all three experiments, the success rate pre move is almost 1
(100%). For the NMAP Scan attack, the success rate drops all the way to 0 once
the dynamic defense of the distributed firewall and spoof guard is initiated. This
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Figure 40: Percent Change for Server Protection DOS Experiments
Figure 41: Results for Server Protection MITM/Scan Experiments
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shows the effectiveness of the firewall in protecting against scanning. For the ARP
and DNS Spoof attacks, the success rate also significantly drops post move. For the
ARP attack, the pre move measurement is 0.995, while the DNS attack has a pre
move measurement of 0.990. The post move measurements of ARP and DNS Spoof
are 0 and 0.07 respectively. The distributed firewall is able to fully prevent the ARP
Spoof from occurring, while the DNS Spoof is able to still have some success.
Because the DNS Spoof attack is reliant on ARP Spoofing, its chances of success are
greatly reduced due to the ARP Spoof attack being neutralized. Without the ARP
Spoofing to reroute the DNS query to the attacker, the attacker has to get lucky and
beat out the real DNS server to succeed. As seen from the results, this is not likely.
So while the dynamic defense doesn’t prevent the DNS Spoof completely, it does
lower the average success rate from 0.99 all the way to 0.07. This dynamic defense
relies on preventing any new ARP packets from being sent to the server from our
external cluster, which is potentially unrealistic since no new devices would be able
to reach the server. The spoof guard is ineffective in this scenario since it doesn’t
know any information about the malicious node. Without the dropping of ARP
packets, most likely the dynamic defense wouldn’t be very effective.
Overall, the Server Protection dynamic defense is very effective against the
DOS attacks and NMAP Scanning, but isn’t able to effectively prevent spoofing
attacks without dropping ARP packets, due to not knowing the identity of the
attacker.
5.2 Attacker Prevention
Attacker Prevention is broken up into three defenses: Isolated Subnet,
Distributed Port Group, and Standard Port Group. These defenses all use a shifting
Virtual Network topology to protect against a malicious node in the internal
network. Unlike in the Server Protection DOS defense, two topologies are used for
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the Attacker Prevention DOS experiments. In this section, we look at the results of
each defense and analyze them, starting with the Isolated Subnet defense.
5.2.1 Isolated Subnet
The Isolated Subnet defense involve detecting a malicious node and
dynamically creating an isolated standard port group to move it to. In this section,
we analyze the results of this defense and its corresponding experiments. We divide
the analysis into two categories: DOS and MITM/Scan experiments. We begin with
the DOS experiments.
Figure 42 shows the results of the DOS Isolated Subnet defense for the first
topology (using an internal client). The results are similar to the Server Protection
DOS experiments, although there are a few differences. The average pre move
download time for all three experiments is again almost exactly 0.5 seconds. For the
DOS TCP, Smurf attack, and DOS ICMP experiments, the average attack
measurement is around the same: 1.19, 1.19, and 1.45 seconds respectively. The
increases in download time are 138%, 149%, and 192% for each experiment,
constituting a large increase in download time for each. The post move average
download times are all slightly below the baseline measurement. Unlike the in the
previous experiments, the isolated subnet was able to prevent the Smurf attack
completely. This is because in this experiment the malicious node is completely
isolated from the rest of the Virtual Network. All three of the experiments show
that the dynamic defense is very effective at stopping the DOS TCP, DOS ICMP,
and Smurf attacks.
Figure 43 shows the results of the DOS Isolated Subnet defense with the
second network topology. For the second topology, where the client is now in the
external network, the results are very similar to the DOS experiments with the first
topology. The main differences are that the ICMP Flooding attack is more
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Figure 42: Results for Isolated Subnet DOS Experiments for Topology 1
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disruptive and the Smurf attack is less disruptive before the dynamic defense is
initiated. The TCP Flood stays at about the same effectiveness. The average
download time pre move is again around 0.5 seconds. The attack measurements are
3 seconds (a 512% increase), 0.76 seconds (a 58% increase), and 1.06 seconds (a
116% increase). As with the first topology, the post move download time is lower
than the baseline for all three experiments, with the DOS ICMP post move
measurement being much lower at an average of 0.38 seconds. Again, any decrease
from pre move to post move is most likely due to circumstances unrelated to the
dynamic defense. However, the decrease does prove that the dynamic defense is
effectively stopping all three DOS attacks. This is expected, as any device that is
isolated is expected to be unable to execute any malicious activity. The information
shows that by using a dynamic topology shift to isolate the attacker, the DOS
attacks are prevented.
Figure 45 shows the results of the MITM/Scan Isolated Subnet defense. The
results for the ARP Spoof, DNS Spoof, and NMAP Scan experiments all show a
significant drop from almost a 100% success rate to a 0% success rate. The pre
move average measurements are 1.0, 0.99, and 0.995 respectively. However, once the
dynamic defense is employed, the post move success rate for all three attacks is 0.
This is expected as isolating a node from the rest of the network would prevent any
external interaction, making any malicious activity impossible. The change in
success rate from 1 to 0 shows how effective the dynamic defense is in preventing
these attacks. The ability of the Virtual Network environment to dynamically create
an isolated subnet and shift the topology to isolate the attacker allows for the
prevention of the MITM and Scan attacks in this malicious node scenario.
Overall, the isolated subnet is very effective in preventing all the attacks run
in our experiments. For all 9 experiments, the isolated subnet dynamic defense fully
neutralizes the malicious node.
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Figure 43: Results for Isolated Subnet DOS Experiments for Topology 2
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Figure 44: Percent Change for Isolated Subnet DOS Experiments
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Figure 45: Results for Isolated Subnet MITM/Scan Experiments
5.2.2 Distributed Port Group
The Distributed Port Group defense involve detecting a malicious node and
shifting the network topology to put the attacker behind a distributed firewall and
spoof guard. In this section, we analyze the results of this defense and its
corresponding experiments. We divide the analysis into two categories: DOS and
MITM/Scan experiments. We begin with the DOS experiments.
Figure 46 shows the results for the DOS defense with the first topology. For
the first topology, where the client is in the internal network, the results show
similarities to the previous experiments. The baseline (pre move) average download
time is still close to 0.5 for all three experiments. Because the topology of these
experiments involves the attacker and the server initially connected to distributed
port groups, the attacks aren’t as effective as in previous experiments. They still do
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Figure 46: Results for Distributed Port Group DOS Experiments for Topology
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slow down the client, especially the TCP Syn Flooding attack. On average, the
Smurf attack measurement is 0.93 seconds (a 99% increase), the DOS TCP attack
measurement is 1.49 seconds (a 211% increase), and the DOS ICMP attack
measurement is 0.67 seconds (a 38% increase). Once the attack is detected and the
dynamic defense is initiated, the download times of all three experiments drops,
although to varying degrees.
Similar to the Server Protection experiments, the post move average
download time drops for the Smurf experiment, but not all the way back down to
the baseline level. This is confusing, as the spoof guard should be effective in
preventing the attacker from spoofing once it is moved to the protected distributed
port group. As we see later in the topology 2 DOS experiments, the Smurf attack is
fully neutralized, making it likely that something is off with the topology 1
experiment that created extra overhead. For the other two attacks, the distributed
firewall is fully effective, dropping the download time back to around the baseline.
For the TCP DOS experiment, the average download time plummets from 1.49
seconds to 0.44 seconds, slightly below the baseline time. The ICMP DOS
experiment also sees a drop in average download time from 0.67 seconds to 0.52,
slightly above the baseline time but still a decline in average time. These two
experiments show that the distributed firewall is fully effective in stopping the
malicious node from initiating a denial of service on the server. Even for the Smurf
attack, which has a slowed post move download time compared to the baseline, the
download time still decreases by 55% from the attack to the post move
measurement. This is a significant enough decrease to effectively prevent the Smurf
attack, despite being slightly slower than before the attack.
Figure 47 shows the results of the second topology for the DOS defense,
where the client is moved from the “internal” to the “external” network. In this set
of experiments, the effect of the attacks are more muted, although they still hamper
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Figure 47: Results for Distributed Port Group DOS Experiments for Topology
2
115
Figure 48: Percent Change for Average Download Time for Distributed Port
Group DOS Experiments
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Figure 49: Results for Distributed Port Group MITM/Scan Experiments
the client’s ability to communicate with the server somewhat. All three baseline
measurements are again around 0.5 seconds. The average attack measurement is
0.66 seconds (a 40% increase) for the Smurf experiment, 0.8 seconds (a 75%
increase) for the TCP DOS experiment, and 0.68 seconds (a 43% increase) for the
ICMP DOS experiment. Once the dynamic defense is utilized, the average download
time for the client for all three experiments drops below the baseline level. Despite
the attacks not being as effective as previous experiments, it is clear that the shift of
the Virtual Network topology to put the attacker behind the distributed firewall
and spoof guard is able to stop the denial of service. In the future, it is necessary to
replicate these DOS experiments with more attackers to be able to test the
distributed firewall dynamic defense against fully effective attacks.
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Figure 49 shows the results of the MITM/Scan defense. The pre move
success rates for the ARP Spoof, DNS Spoof, and NMAP Scan experiments are
again all near 1 (100%). However, once the malicious node is moved behind the
distributed firewall and spoof guard, the success rates of all three drop significantly,
albeit to varying degrees. For the NMAP Scan experiment, the post move success
rate is 0.5. This means that the NMAP Scan is consistently able to verify that the
server is up, but fails to determine the open ports on the server. While the attack is
able to derive some information, the most important information of open ports,
which is used to determine vulnerability in a machine, is blocked by the distributed
firewall. So while the malicious node’s scan doesn’t fail completely, the dynamic
defense hinders its ability to find vulnerabilities. For ARP Spoof, the success rate
plummets after the attacker is shifted behind the spoof guard. The average success
rate goes from 0.995 to 0.11. Most likely this should have dropped down to 0, but
for some reason the first ARP attack out of ten for each run of this experiment was
successful post move. This is possibly due to the spoof guard needing more time
than expected to start detecting spoofing attacks, or perhaps something with the
way the spoof guard works prevents it from detecting the first time a node tries to
spoof a packet. Either way, the attack success rate still drops substantially, showing
the dynamic defense’s effectiveness. For the DNS Spoof, the spoof guard is able to
completely stop the attack. The average success rate from pre move to post move
goes from 1 all the way down to 0. Even if the spoof guard isn’t able to stop the
ARP Spoof part of the DNS Spoof attack, the spoof guard detects the DNS
Spoofing and immediately drops the spoofed packets. The MITM/Scan experiments
show that the dynamic defense can still prevent a large number of attacks, even if it
is not 100% effective.
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Overall, this dynamic defense is effective in stopping every attack almost
completely. It is not able to fully prevent the NMAP Scan and Smurf attacks,
though it substantially lowers the success rate of each.
5.2.3 Standard Port Group
For the Standard Port Group defense, a malicious node is detected and
moved to a dynamically created standard port group with spoofing protections. In
this section, we analyze the results of this defense and its corresponding
experiments. Since the protections involve spoofing, there is only a MITM section of
these experiments. We start by analyzing the ARP Spoof and DNS Spoof
experiment results.
Figure 50 shows the results of the defense and the two experiments run. As
can be seen from the results, the dynamic defense had no effect on the attacks.
Both the ARP Spoof and DNS Spoof had an average success rate of 1 for the pre
move and post move measurements. While not likely, it is possible that the
standard port group was ineffective due to the use of nested virtualization. If these
experiments are run on a full Virtual Network environment, it would show whether
the standard port group dynamic defense is truly unsuccessful or whether the failure
is the result of the use of nested virtualization.
Overall, this dynamic defense is completely powerless in stopping the ARP
Spoof and DNS Spoof attacks.
5.3 Analysis
In this section, we summarize the analyses of all the different defenses and
their experiments, and describe the trends of the dynamic defenses. Again, the
analysis is divided between the DOS and the MITM/Scan experiments. We begin
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Figure 50: Results for the Standard Port Group Experiments
with a summary of the DOS experiments and the effects of the dynamic defenses on
the DOS attacks, followed by the MITM/Scan experiments.
Overall, the dynamic defenses, outside of the standard port group, are able
to effectively protect the server and neutralize the attacker. For the DOS attack
defenses, the post move download times are almost all below the baseline (pre
move) level. The exception to that is the Server Protection defense and one of the
Smurf attack experiments for the Distributed Port Group defense. In those cases,
the distributed firewall is not able to fully negate the effects of the denial of service,
most likely due to the spoofing used in the attack. However, the dynamic defense is
still able to slow down the attack and cut the average download time by around
50% in both cases. Outside of those two DOS experiments, the rest of the
experiments show that the use of a shifting topology is able to successfully protect
the server and completely stop the attacker. For some of the experiments, the DOS
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attacks aren’t as effective as they are in other experiments, but the results still show
an obvious positive effect by the dynamic defenses. Those experiments could be
re-run with more malicious nodes to fully prove the effectiveness of the dynamic
defenses, but there is no reason to believe the dynamic defenses wouldn’t still be
able to fully prevent the denial of service.
For the MITM/Scan attacks, the dynamic defenses are fully effective too,
outside of the standard port group. All the pre move average success rates for every
experiment are around 1, meaning a 100% success rate. Once the dynamic defenses
are initiated, most of the post move average success rates become 0. One of the
ARP Spoof experiments shows a potential flaw with one dynamic defense, with the
attack succeeding on the first attempt after the move, but failing all attempts after
that. Despite this potential flaw, the dynamic defense still drops the success rate of
the attack from 1.0 down to 0.11, a very effective defense. One of of the DNS Spoof
experiments falls to around 0.07, because the spoofing of the DNS Packet is able to
get around the distributed firewall. However, since the DNS Spoof attack relies on
ARP Spoofing, which is prevented by the distributed firewall, the DNS spoof attack
has to beat out the real DNS server in replying to the DNS request packet. This is
not highly successful, which is why we see the DNS Spoof experiment’s post move
success rate fall all the way to 0.07. Besides the failure of the standard port group,
the dynamic defenses lower the success rate of each attack significantly. Only one
experiment, the distributed port group NMAP Scan experiment, has a post move
success rate much higher than 0.1, and even that success rate is a 0.5 only because
it determines that the host is up. However, the scan is not able to discover the port
information of the server, the most important part of the scan. For all three MITM
and Scan attacks, the dynamic defenses are fully effective in either completely
neutralizing the attack or in causing the malicious node to have a very low rate of
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success. In each case, outside the standard port group, the success rate is always
significantly lowered once the dynamic defense is initiated.
For all experiments, the dynamic defenses, other than the standard port
group, are very effective in stopping all six attacks. This shows that by dynamically
shifting the topology, a Virtual Network can be protected from network attacks.
This could be effectively utilized in the future to help secure Virtual Networks, if
the use cases of Virtual Networks expands outside of data centers. There are some
weaknesses to this system, but overall, Virtual Networks would benefit from fully
using their flexibility to protect resources within the network.
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Chapter 6
RELATED WORKS
Utilizing the flexibility of a network to shift topology for security purposes is
not a unique idea. Dynamic topology shifting and testing through attack
simulations has been done with different SDN and virtual environments. There are
a few papers that look at utilizing SDN resources or creating SDN add ons to
increase security dynamically. Gillani et al. [15] look at securing the weakness of
SDNs where control and data packets share critical links, opening up an attack
vector for DDOS attacks. They create a system called ReCON that uses existing
SDN resources to dynamically defend against DDOS attacks of the control plane. It
does this by lowering the amount of sharing of links for data and control packets,
and by dynamically using underutilized resources to increase the capacity of control
agents. Both these serve to make DDOS attacks on the control messages more
difficult. ReCON quantifies the resilience of the control network by measuring link
isolation and criticality. The system then uses the metric to decide where to place
network links for the control and data planes. To test their system, the authors run
two types of DDOS attacks: Link Sharing-based DDOS and Control Capacity-based
DDOS. Their results show a decrease in DDOS effectiveness by about 40% and a
doubled OpenFlow agent capacity. While this system does dynamically defend
against network attacks, they only protect against DDOS attacks and not any other
type of network attack. Their system is also built for SDNs rather than Virtual
Networks, and they simulate their experiments rather than running them in a true
network environment.
Yoon et al. [63] investigate the ability of Software-Defined Networks to
replace hardware security functions. To do this they implement four types of
network security functions in a SDN environment: in-line mode security, passive
mode security, network anomaly detection, and advanced security. These functions
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are implemented as applications in a Floodlight SDN controller and tested in a real
SDN environment to discover the feasibility of SDN-based security. For in-line mode
security, firewall and IPS applications are implemented. Passive mode security is
implemented as an IDS application. For network anomaly detection, network
scanning and DDOS detector applications are created. The advanced security
functions implement stateful firewall and network reflector applications. Each
implementation has different positives and negatives in regard to the fit in a SDN
environment. Through experimentation the authors concluded that the passive
mode and network anomaly detection functions were the most feasible in SDN
environments, while the in-line mode functions could be implemented for networks
that require security on only a small number of flows. For the advanced security
functions, they were only effective when the modifications made to packets were
processed in hardware rather than software. While the authors use dynamic security
components, they use Software-Defined networks to achieve security, but not Virtual
Networks. Their system also doesn’t test the security of the functions, but rather
the overhead they incur and the feasibility of their implementation.
Achleitner et al. [1] look at defending against advanced network scanning by
developing the Reconnaissance Deception System (RDS). RDS is based on
Software-Defined Networks and deceives scanners by simulating incorrect network
topologies. The attacker is assumed to be a malicious node operating from within
the network, allowing for the RDS to manipulate its view of the network. RDS
works by first detecting the threat and discovering the malicious node. RDS then
uses fake network features to simulate a network view which can only be viewed by
the attacker. The RDS system adds the capability to forge packets and generate
these fake networks into the SDN controllers. For their experiments, their results
show much longer times for scanning a network while creating very little overhead.
RDS adds time to malicious scanning at up to a factor of 115, while only creating a
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network overhead of 0.2 milliseconds. This system also utilizes dynamic shifting of
network topologies, but does this with a Software-Defined Network rather than a
real Virtual Network. It also doesn’t explore other defenses and attack types other
than scanning. It also requires new SDN controllers and system setup rather than
using portable software or existing technology.
Shin et al. [47] look at two potential security weaknesses in SDN
environments and creates solutions for each. One of the weaknesses is that changes
in flow and network statistics can only be detected by controller applications
through polling, which could prevent applications looking for malicious behavior to
respond properly. To solve this they create a technique called “actuating trigger”
that allows the data plane to report network and payload information to the control
plane. It could then trigger a predefined set of flow rules to cause an immediate
reaction to any malicious behavior that is detected. Their experimentation shows
that the actuating trigger adds very little overhead but allows for quicker threat
detection and reaction. While they do look at dynamic reaction to malicious
behavior, it is in an SDN and not a Virtual Network environment. It also involves
adding to the SDN architecture rather than using existing features for attack
mitigation.
Cox et al. [13] create Net Flow Guard (NFG), an SDN app which can detect
rogue DHCP servers and disable them. It does so automatically and is modular.
Their implementation includes an OpenFlow switch connected to a controller with
NFG on it. The switch then forwards DHCP packets to the controller for analysis to
determine the validity of the server. They utilize Mininet to evaluate their
application and found NFG to be effective in discovering malicious DHCP activity.
While they do protect against DHCP attacks, their system doesn’t protects against
other network attacks and doesn’t make any changes to the network topology in
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response. Their experiments are simulated rather than run in a real network and
their system is for SDNs, not Virtual Networks.
Kreutx et al. [26] look at attack vectors that exploit certain weaknesses in
SDNs. For each threat they describe how the attacks can be prevented by making
changes to SDN’s architecture. They then take all the solutions presented and use
them to create a general outline of a more secure SDN architecture. The idea
behind this is that SDNs should be inherently secure and not have to depend on
external software to secure the environment. This system looks at Software-Defined
Network security and recreating the architecture to have built-in security. However,
they don’t look at Virtual Networks and they also change the existing system rather
than use any dynamic shifting in the network. They also doesn’t test the suggested
architecture with any experimentation.
Each of these works utilizes dynamic SDN shifts, either through flows or
other means. However, none of them look at Virtual Network environments and
most of them don’t protect against a varied set of network attacks, usually only
protecting against one attack type.
There are also works that involve the use of dynamic virtual security
components in SDNs or virtual environments. These works look at ways to use
those virtual components to dynamically secure the network. Park et al. [41] use
Network Function Virtualization to create a new SDN framework that allows for
dynamic provisioning of virtualized, lightweight IDS network functions. SDN
controllers are used to deploy and control the IDSs throughout the network while
looking at the high-level network view. Rather than create big IDSs, the system
creates small intrusion detection network functions and chains them together,
deciding on the fly which ones to create and where to put them. The system
architecture relies on four different components: a traffic classifier, a network
functions pool, a service chaining module, and a virtual machine manager. The
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SDN controllers monitor the path of flows, and based on that determine which
switches to put certain IDS network functions on. The service pool has two different
types of IDS network functions: packet header inspection and deep packet
inspection. The packet header and deep packet inspection are selected based on
protocols and ports, allowing for only the necessary IDS functions to be used in
each location. The virtual machine manager then creates the service chain using the
network functions selected. This service chain is dynamically created and allocated
based on situation. Their testing shows that their system uses less than 7 MB of
RAM, much smaller than general IDSs. Their system also takes less than a
millesecond on average to spawn a single network function. While this system also
uses dynamic virtual network security, it is used in an SDN environment with
physical networking components rather than in a Virtual Network environment.
Hongda et al. [28] create a new Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
called vNIDS, which is used to efficiently create and provision virtual NIDSs. The
goal is to make NIDSs more flexible than how they are currently used as middle
boxes, where they can’t be moved or created easily. They also must make sure the
virtualized NIDSs don’t miss attacks and that they are provisioned properly and
don’t overuse resources. The two main goals are to create effective intrusion
detection and non-monolithic NIDS provisioning. The first goal is accomplished by
dividing detection states into local and global, lowering the amount of data that
must be shared between virtualized NIDSs. The second goal is accomplished by
dividing IDSs into “microservices”: header-based detection, protocol parse, and
payload-based detection. Each microservice can be created separately and placed
anywhere in the network in any numbers, as well as chained together. Their
evaluation compares the vNIDS architecture to the Bro NIDS. Their system shows a
similar ability to detect attacks with increased flexibility. The vNIDS architecture
does, however, have increased overhead compared the Bro NIDS, which the authors
127
attribute to the inefficiency of their implementation for the experiments and say can
be mitigated. This system utilizes virtualized security, but it is more about
provisioning pre attack rather than using flexibility to react to an attack that is
occurring.
Shin et al. [46] look at the use of virtualized network security functions in
securing a network. There is a problem of having to deploy countless security
middle-boxes in different locations throughout physical networks and the difficulty
of moving them if the security function is needed elsewhere. They create a system
called NetSecVisor, which can be used by admins to determine which security
functions to put where. The system utilizes pre-set security middle-boxes and SDN
technology to accomplish this. NetSecVisor provides security by rerouting flows
based on events, such as a VM being migrated from one host to another. If that VM
is being protected by a security middle-box on the first host, the system dynamically
reroutes the flows to still pass through that middle-box. Their evaluations show
that their system adds very little overhead, while being able to reroute traffic to the
IDSs and firewall. While this system provides dynamic isolation and protection of
VMs, it still relies on physical middle-boxes rather than virtual network security
components. It also isn’t used in a true Virtual Network environment, instead using
an OpenFlow SDN network that doesn’t utilize any Virtual Network technology.
Beham et al. [6] look at the use of honeypots and IDSs in nested
virtualization as compared to their use in regular virtualization. They look at the
nested hypervisors of KVM on top of KVM for an IDS and a honeypot and
compared the time for analysis versus those security components on top of just a
single KVM hypervisor. Their results show a large increase in execution time for
nested virtualization to produce similar results in detecting and analyzing malicious
network behavior. These experiments look at comparing efficiency of nested
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virtualization to regular virtualization, rather than looking at securing Virtual
Networks.
All these papers either utilize virtualization in a physical SDN network or
don’t use dynamic topology shifts in reaction to attacks, but rather use pre-planned
security. While there are a lot of works looking at SDN and Virtual Network
security, none really looks at using a Virtual Network’s flexibility to shift the
network topology in reaction to a network attack.
129
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
With the idea of Virtual Networks and the potential for their expanded use in
the future, we explore the use of dynamic changes to a Virtual Network’s topology
to protect resources and defend against malicious activities. We utilize VMware
vSphere and vCenter to set up our environment and utilize nested virtualization to
emulate the use of multiple, underlying, physical network components. We theorize
that the flexibility of a Virtual Network to dynamically change its topology can be
used for network security purposes. To test our theory, we create a set of dynamic
defenses and experiments to determine the validity of these defenses. There are 4
different groups of defenses: Server Protection, Isolated Subnet, Distributed Port
Group, and Standard Port Group. The Server Protection defenses involves detecting
an attack against a server and shifting the server behind a protected subnet. The
other three defenses involve detecting a malicious node and shifting the Virtual
Network topology so that the attacker is behind some protection. The Isolated
Subnet defense dynamically creates an isolated subnet and move the attacker to it.
The Distributed Port Group defense puts the attacker behind a distributed firewall
and spoof guard. The Standard Port Group defense dynamically creates a standard
port group with spoofing protections and moves the attacker to it.
For each defense we run 6 to 9 different experiments based on attack type,
with the attacks being used to test the validity of each dynamic defense. The
network attacks used are ICMP Flooding, TCP Syn Flooding, Smurf attack, ARP
Spoofing, DNS Spoofing, and NMAP Scanning. The DOS defense experiments are
run by having a client download a file from a server, with the attacker trying to slow
down or prevent the download. The MITM/Scan defense experiments are each run
with the attacker trying to compromise the client based on the attack. Our
validation shows that most of the dynamic defenses are very effective in stopping
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each attack. The Standard Port Group defense is the one dynamic defense that is
completely ineffective. The ability to stop spoofing attacks from an unknown
location is also a problem, as the Smurf attack is not able to be completely stopped
in some of the experiments due to its spoofing. It is, however, still slowed to a point
that the client-server connection is not much slower than before the attack is run.
The Server Protection defense shows positive results for both the MITM and
DOS attacks. The download speed of the client falls from above 1 second when
being attacked, to below the baseline level of 0.5 seconds for two of the DOS
attacks. The third DOS attack falls to a 0.9 second average, which is still a 53%
drop. The MITM/Scan attacks all fall from a success rate of around 1 to 0, or 0.07
for the DNS Spoof attack. The Isolated Subnet defense is very effective against all
attacks, dropping the download times below the 0.5 second baseline level for all the
DOS attacks and dropping the MITM/Scan attack success rates from 1 to 0. The
Distributed Port Group defense shows similar results to the Server Protection
defense. For the DOS attacks, 5 out of 6 download times fall below the baseline
average, while the one outlier still falls by 55% from the attack measurement to the
post dynamic defense measurement. The MITM/Scan attacks all have lowered
success rates, falling from 1 to 0, 0.11, and 0.5. Despite NMAP Scan having a
success rate of 0.5, it isn’t able to collect information to determine vulnerability due
to the dynamic defense. Finally, the Standard Port Group defense shows it is unable
to protect against spoofing attacks, with the success rates of the attacks staying at 1.
Overall, our experiments show that the ability to dynamically shift
topologies and quickly spin up new security components in a Virtual Network is
very effective at protecting resources and preventing attacks. Currently, the
flexibility of Virtual Networks is used more as a failsafe rather than for security
purposes. We would recommend that in the future, as the technology of Virtual
Networks is more widely adapted and potentially used more in spaces outside of
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data centers, that the ability to switch the topology at a moments notice would be
used for security purposes. In the future, we plan to expand on the experiments and
the system built. We will create larger, more complex and more realistic topologies
for experimentation, rather than the one client, one server, one attacker topologies
that we used. Using more clients, more attackers, and more attack power would
help the testing of the security responses. These expanded experiments would be a
step in the right direction for better Virtual Network security.
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